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DISSOLVING FAMILY RELATIONS:
TERMINATION OF PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONS-AN OVERVIEW*
Jacqueline Y. Parker**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of jurisdictions have statutory provisions permitting termination of parental rights. 1 Usually, statutes contain no formal, direct definition of the phrase "termination of parental rights,"
although some states define it indirectly by defining either "parentchild relationship ' 2 or "parents." '3 For example, in Illinois,
*
This article is excerpted from a treatise entitled FAMILY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES by
L. Wardle, C. Blakesly & J. Parker. It is to be published later this year by the Callaghan
Publishing Company.
** Jacqueline Y. Parker (J.D. New England School of Law, 1977; LL.M. Harvard, 1981)
left law teaching at New England School of Law and Albany Law School to enjoy the practice of
law at the Boston firm of Parker, Coulter, Daley & White. She believes that it is the duty of the
legal profession to represent the "unrepresented" in our society, especially children because they
are incapable of hiring their own lawyers.
I. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-531 to -544
(1974 & Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 232-239 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 19-11-101, 19-11-103 to -110 (1978 & Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1732d(e), -43a (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1101-1113 (1981 & Supp. 1984);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(2)(d), (7) (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-41, 1511-51, 15-11-54 (1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 571-61 to -63 (1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE
§§ 16-2001 to -2015 (1979 & Supp. 1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to -21 (Smith-Hurd
1972 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-5-2 to -6 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 600A.I-.9 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-824(c) (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 199.601-.617 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1600-:1606 (West 1983
& Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4051-4057 (Supp. 1985); MICH. COMe. LAWS
ANN. §§ 710.21-.70 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.221-.245 (West 1982 & Supp.
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.477 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-601 to -612
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-291 to -294 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 128.005-.150 (1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170C:1-:15 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-18 to -20 (West 1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-1 to -55 (1981 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 611-634 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 7A-289.22-.34 (1981 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2720-44 to -46 (1974 & Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1130-1134 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419.523-.527 (1985);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1560 to -1610 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-36 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-147 to -148 (1984
& Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-48 (Supp. 1985); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2509 (_
); VA. CODE § 16.1-283
(Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5 (Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.40-.435 (West Supp.
1985); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-309 (Supp. 1985).
2. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(11) (1974) ("Parent-child relationship. includes all
rights, privileges, duties and obligations existing between parent and child, including inheritance
rights"). See also IDAHO CODE § 16-2002(k) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-603(3) (1985).
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[plarents means the father or mother of a child and includes any adoptive parent. It also includes the father whose paternity is presumed or
has been established under the law of this or another jurisdiction. It does
not include a parent whose rights in respect of the minor have been terminated in any manner provided by law.4

On the other hand, the Colorado statute provides a direct, concise definition: " 'Termination of the parent-child legal relationship' means the
permanent elimination by court order of all parental rights and duties,
including residual parental rights and responsibilities .... "I
As implied by the above phrase, "elimination by court order of all
parental rights and duties," termination of parental rights is best defined in terms of its drastic effects. Typically, termination of parental
rights results in a total severance of the normal parent-child relationship, rendering the family into strangers. Thus, both the parents' right
to custody and control of the child, and the reciprocal duty to support
the child, are abolished.' This even includes the right to notice of pro-

3. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(10) (1974); CONN GEN STAT. ANN. § 17-32d(b)
(West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2002j (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(h) (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:1600(3) (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015( 1) (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.021(5) (Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-245(2) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.015
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:2(VIII) (1978); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-2 (West
1976).
4. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(26) (1978). Wisconsin also has a precise definition of termination of parental rights. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.40(2) (West Supp. 1985).
6. The effect of termination of parental rights is exemplified by the statutory language of
the following states: ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1984) ("terminate parental rights and responsibilities of one or both parents"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (1974) ("divest the parent
and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other except the
right of the child to inherit and support from the parent"); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a) (West Supp.
1986) ("free from the custody and control of either or both of his or her parents"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-11-108(l) (Supp. 1985) ("divests the child and the parent of all legal rights, powers,
privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other, but it shall not modify
the child's status as an heir at law which shall cease only upon a final decree of adoption"); CONN.
GEN STAT. ANN. § 17-32d(e) (West Supp. 1985) ("complete severance by court order of the legal
relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1112 (1981) ("all
of the rights, duties, privileges and obligations recognized by law between the person or persons
whose parental rights are terminated and the child shall forever thereafter cease to exist"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-54 (1985) ("terminates all his rights and obligations with respect to the child
and all rights and obligations of the child to the parent arising from the parental relationship,
including rights of inheritance"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-63 (1976) ("no judgement . . .shall
operate to terminate the mutual rights of inheritance of the child and the parent . . .unless and
until the child has been legally adopted"); IDAHO CODE § 16-201 I (1979) ("shall divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations, including rights of inheritance,
with respect to each other"); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-6(a) (Burns Supp. 1985) ("When the
juvenile or probate court terminates the parent-child relationship, all rights, powers, privileges,
immunities, duties and obligations, (including any rights to custody, control, visitation or support)
pertaining to that relationship are permanently terminated...."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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ceedings for adoption of the child by someone else.7 The only vestiges
of the parent-child relationship that are sometimes statutorily retained
are inheritance 8 and religious affiliation. 9

199.613 (Baldwin 1985) ("all legal relationships between the parents and child shall cease to
exist, the same as if the relationship of parent and child had never existed, except that the child
shall retain the right to inherit"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1600(4) (West 1983) (-permanent
elimination by court order of all parental rights and duties including residual parental rights");
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4056(l) (Supp. 1985) ("divests the parent and child of all legal
rights, powers, priviliges, immunities, duties and obligations to each other as parent and child,
except the inheritance rights between the child and his parent"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-109
(Supp. 1985) ("the court may terminate all the parental rights of the parent or parents regarding
the child, and terminate the right of the child to inherit from such parent or parents"); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-611(1) (1985) ("divest the child and the parents of all legal rights, powers,
immunites, duties and obligations with respect to each other . . . except the right of the child to
inherit from the parent"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-293 (1984) ("shall divest the parent and child of
all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other and the parents shall
have no rights of inheritance with respect to such juvenile"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.110 (1986)
("judicially depriving the parent or parents of the custody and control of, and terminating the
parental rights of the parent or parents with respect to the child"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170C:12 (1978) ("shall divest both the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and
obligations . . . . The rights of inheritance of both parents and the child shall not be divested
until the adoption of said child"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-20 ( West 1976) ("no further control and
authority over the person of the child"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 631 (McKinney 1983) ("for the
commitment of the guardianship and custody of the child"); N.C. GEN STAT. § 7A-289.33 (Supp.
1985) ("completely and permanently terminates all rights and obligations of the parent to the
child and of the child to the parent, arising from the parental relationship, except that the child's
right of inheritance from his or her parent shall not terminate until such time as a final order of
adoption is issued"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (1974) ("terminates all his rights and obligations with respect to the child and of the child to or through him arising from the parental relationship"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1132 (West Supp. 1985) ("terminates the parent-child
relationship, including the parent's right to the custody of the child and his right to visit the child,
his right to control the child's training and education, the necessity for the parent to consent to the
adoption of the child and the parent's right to the earnings of the child, and the parent's right to
inherit from or through the child"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-17 (198 1) ("the parents of such child
shall be deprived, by the decree, of all legal rights respecting the child, and the child shall be freed
from all obligations of maintenance and obedience respecting his natural parents"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-148 (1984) ("terminates all his rights and obligations with respect to the child and of
the child to him arising from the parental relationship"); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon
Supp. 1986) ("divests the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers,
with respect to each other, except that the child retains the right to inherit from and through its
divested parent unless the court otherwise provides"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(1)(c)(3)
(Supp. 1985) ("permanently terminates the legal parent-child relationship and all the rights and
duties, including residual parental rights and duties, of the parent or parents involved"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.40(2) (West Supp. 1985) ("all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties and
obligations existing between parent and child are permanently severed"); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-317
(Supp. 1985) ("divests the parent of all legal rights, privileges, duties and support obligations with
respect to each other except the right of the child to inherit from the parent shall not be
affected").
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-41(c)(1) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-3(2)
(Burns Supp. 1985).
8. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-32d(e)
(West Supp. 1985); HAWAH REV. STAT. § 571-63 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.613 (Baldwin 1985);
ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 535 (1981). But see. e.g.. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
Published
by eCommons,
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Termination of parental rights cases arise in two basic contexts.
The first context is adoption. Usually, before a child can be adopted,
the natural parents' rights must be extinguished either by consent, by
special procedures at the adoption proceeding that obviate the need for
consent, 10 or in a termination of parental rights proceeding. A typical
example of termination of parental rights in the adoption context occurs when a stepparent wishes to adopt the child of his or her spouse.
In order to accomplish this, the parental rights of the noncustodial natural parent must first be terminated. In this context, termination of
parental rights is not triggered by the need for child protection as it
may be a non-neglectful parent's rights that are being terminated.
The second context, which will be the focus of this article, is child
protection, where the court has previously taken jurisdiction over a
child who has been abused, neglected, or abandoned.1" Termination of
parental rights as a result of child abuse or neglect is common. Consequently, it is typical for states to include termination as a section or
subsection of their child neglect laws, rather than putting it in a separate chapter. 2 At times, termination of parental rights is not even a
separate statutory procedure, but instead, it is only a possible disposition at a neglect hearing.13 On the other hand, approximately half of
the states require a separate proceeding.' 4

710.60 (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-611(1) (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A289.33 (Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170C:12 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.3
(Page 1980); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
9. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-32d(e) (West Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-13
(1981).
10. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532 (1981 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. DOM REL.
LAW §§ II I(1)(d), II I-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1986). For a discussion on legal injury arising in adoption, see L. WARDLE. C. BLAKESLEY & J. PARKER, FAMILY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES
(1986) [hereinafter cited as FAMILY LAW].
II. See, e.g.. In re Lem, 164 A.2d 345 (D.C. 1960); In re McDonald, 201 N.W.2d 447
(Iowa 1972).
12. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 3, 66
(1975). For a listing of states that have separate statutory chapters, see id. at 10-1I, 66.
13. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.40 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
14. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-537 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a) (West
Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-51 (1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 571-61 to -62 (1976 &
Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4.1 (Burns Supp.
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.111 (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603 (Baldwin
1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1602 (West Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-105 (Supp.
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.452 (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.090 (1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:10 (1977); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-18 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32-1-31 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 622-623, 625 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986); OR.
REV. STAT. § 419.525 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-71572 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147 (Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
15.01-07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.422 (West Supp. 1985); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-2-308 to -318 (Supp. 1985).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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New York is representative of the jurisdictions which separate termination of parental rights proceedings from child neglect proceedings. 5 Although New York is unique in having two separate hearings,
one for fact-finding 6 and one for disposition,' 7 other states combine
this two-step process into a single hearing.' 8 Some states also require
the provision of social reports that make recommendations to the court
on disposition as a prerequisite to the hearing.' 9 For example, in New
York, a "'fact-finding hearing' means . . . a hearing to determine
whether the allegations required . . .are supported by clear and convincing proof." 20 The allegations required are, first, that the child is
under eighteen; 2 ' second, that the child is in the care of an authorized
agency;22 third, that the authorized agency has made "diligent efforts
to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship";2 3 and, fourth,
that the parent has "failed for a period of more than one year following
the date such child came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or
plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able

to do

So.

1

124

If the fact-finding hearing results in an unfavorable ruling

for the parent, a "dispositional hearing" is held "to determine what
order of disposition should be made in accordance with the best inter25
ests of the child."
It should be noted, however, that even typical statutes like New
York's are in a constant state of flux due to rapid changes in the laws
regarding neglected children. Not only did over twenty states amend
their termination of parental rights statutes between 1974 and 1980,26
15. Compare N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 611-671 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986) (permanent
termination of parental rights, adoption, guardianship, and custody) with N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§§ 411-428 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986) (child protective services).
16. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney 1983).
17. See id. § 623.
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-536 to -537 (1974 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 571-62 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.452
(Vernon Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:10 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7.1
(1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.422 (West Supp. 1985).
19. See, e.g.. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.455 (Vernon Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
170-C:9 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.422 (West Supp. 1985).
20. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney 1983). Note that this statute had a preponderance of the evidence standard until it was declared unconstitutional in Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982), after which the statute was amended to provide for a clear and convincing proof
standard.
21. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614(l)(a) (McKinney 1983).
22. Id. § 614(l)(b) (which means the child was previously declared neglected).

23. Id.§ 614(l)(c).
24. Id.§ 614(I)(d).
25. Id. § 623. See also id.§ 631 (court's options at the conclusion of a dispositional
hearing).
See Coleman, 1985
Standards for Termination of Parental Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 315,
Published26.
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but there has also been a trend toward constitutionalization. For example, the preponderance of the evidence standard, contained in the former version of the above-described New York statute, was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v.
Kramer,47 wherein the United States Supreme Court constitutionally
mandated a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof.2 8 This decision gave rise to subsequent changes in various statutes. Other major
trends reflected in the statutory amendments include avoiding vagueness by. providing specific grounds for termination, and avoiding a
breach of substantive due process by requiring a showing of harmful
effect on the child as opposed to merely focusing on bad parental conduct.2 9 The trend is also to avoid lack of notice by allowing a parent
whose child has been adjudicated neglected in a care and protection
proceeding to make a plan with the social service agency for remedying
the neglect that will otherwise result in termination, and to avoid leaving the child in "limbo" status by setting out time limits for determining whether the child will be returned to the parent or have his or her
parental rights terminated."0
Historically, the legal response to child abuse has gone through
three stages: punitive, protective, and rehabilitative. The earliest case
of penal response to child abuse in this country appears to have occurred in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1655.1 It involved a
master's maltreatment of a twelve-year-old apprentice who died as a
result of the beatings the master inflicted.3 2 The master was convicted
of manslaughter and ordered to be "burned in the hand," and to forfeit
all of hit goods. 3 Such "treatment" of child abuse, while punishing the
abusing party, also resulted in great financial and emotional hardship
for the family, including the child on whose behalf criminal action was
instituted.
Today, the criminal law generally is a disfavored legal mechanism
for dealing with child abuse. There are significant practical problems
with utilization of the criminal law, including the higher level of proof

326-28 (1980).
27. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
28. Id. at 769.
29. For a discussion of substantive due process, see infra notes 48-113
text. For a discussion of void for vagueness standards, see infra notes 156-85
text.
30. See Coleman, supra note 26, at 328-29. See also infra notes 114-85
text.
31. See Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part P"Historical Overview,
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293, 303-04 (1972).
32. Id. at 303.
33. Id. at 304.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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required in criminal court than in civil court, and the added difficulty
of establishing a requisite level of intent demanded as an element of the
crime.3 4 Moreover, use of the criminal law does not change any of the
underlying causes of child abuse nor offer significant rehabilitative advantages.3 5 In fact, criminal prosecution may serve to add to the hostility of an abusive parent. 6
The second major response to the law was protective-the removal
of the child victim from the home of the abusive parent. Two cases in
the Massachusetts Bay Colonies in the 1670's involved children removed from their homes because their parents were found to be "unfit."' 37 During the last two centuries, the law has gone through two
phases of the removal response to child abuse. The first child-saving
efforts were institutional. 8 Beginning in the 1820's, juvenile reformatories, asylums, industrial schools, and "refuges" were opened. Initially
the result of private action, these institutions later were imitated by the
states. Well into the twentieth century, the major state response to
child abuse was to remove the victims of child abuse from their homes
and place them in protective institutions. Ironically, this method of intervention often involved the criminal laws, and frequently the institutions where the neglected or abused children were committed were
criminal institutions.3 9
The second "phase" of protective response by the government to
child abuse was to place the abused child in a private home.4 0 Actually,
the use of private placement is at least as old as the institutional state
response to child abuse. In fact, the use of apprenticeship to a master
by indenture was the principal method of child care for dependent or
orphaned children until the middle of the nineteenth century.4 1 However, until the "refuge" movement began in the 1820's, public authorities rarely intervened in family life to protect children from parental
neglect or abuse and, when governments began responding systematically to child abuse as a problem, they adopted the institutional response.4 2 By the 1850's, there were stirrings of anti-institutional reform. Part of this involved the "moral disinfectant" movement to place

34. See generally, Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
679 (1966); Note, Child Maltreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J. FAM. L. 115
(1979).
35. See generally Paulsen, supra note 34.
36. See Note, supra note 34, at 135-36.
37. Thomas, supra note 31, at 304.
38. Id. at 306.
39. Id. at 312.
40. Id. at 306.
41. Id. at 303.
Published42.by eCommons,
1985
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poor and neglected city children in foster homes out of the cities.' 3 It
partook of a "back-to-nature farm-purification" mysticism. Nevertheless, until the middle of the twentieth century, the institutional response
was the predominant response to child neglect and abuse. For instance,
during 1900, the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, a quasi-governmental social agency, placed six children in
private homes; 2407 were placed in institutions."'
The problem with both phases of the "protective" response is that
it compounded the injury to the victimized child. It added to the damage and trauma of attack by a parent the additional trauma of separation from the family.' 5 The most recent approach of the law to the
problem of child abuse has been the rehabilitative or reconstructive approach."6 This approach recognizes that child abuse is merely one manifestation of overall parental and family failure. It recognizes the
child's need for continuity of parental supervision, and takes into account the damage and trauma done to a child when he or she is removed from the home. The rehabilitative approach is predicated on the
idea that if the family is a valuable unit worth preserving, if parental
care is to be preferred over institutional or foster parent supervision,
and if child abuse is a remediable problem, the state should devote its
resources and legal attention to rehabilitating the family and solving
the problem of child abuse rather than merely protecting the child
from incidents of abuse.
Thus, the law has gone through three stages of development in
reaching the currently favored response to child abuse. Initially, the
law was used as a sword to punish the offender. Next, the law was
invoked as a shield to protect the victim. Now it is being proposed that
the law be used as a supportive service to rehabilitate the family as a
whole. As each new approach has developed, the law has grown (more
than changed) to accommodate the new approach. The law today is the
cumulative product of this evolution. 47 Presently, criminal laws universally prohibit and penalize child abuse, Juvenile Court Acts provide
additional "protective" child removal mechanisms, and some recent
legislation and administrative regulations now emphasize the current
trend toward family rehabilitation as a response to child abuse. Unfortunately, however, termination of parental rights is still sometimes a
necessary response, especially if rehabilitation efforts have failed.

43. Id. at 307.
44. Id. at 311.
45. See Note, supra note 34, at 143.
46. Id. at 135-36.
47. See Paulsen, supra note 34.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL

ISSUES: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

As discussed, termination of parental rights is a procedure with
far-reaching consequences because it is both absolute and irrevocable.
Upon termination a parent loses not only physical custody of the child,
but also the right to visit or even communicate with the child.4 8 The
question that arises is what governmental interests are sufficiently compelling or important to justify the extreme remedy of a permanent separation of parents from their natural children. Unfortunately, the answer to this question was avoided by the United States Supreme' Court
in Doe v. Delaware,4 9 where the Court dismissed the case on procedural
grounds. The Court, in dismissing the case, failed to address the question of whether Delaware's termination of parental rights statute deprived parents of their liberty interests without substantive due process
by destroying family integrity without first requiring a showing that
parental misconduct was causing harm to their children.5 0 Thus, it is
still unsettled whether substantive due process under the fourteenth
amendment requires that a state statute link parental unfitness to a
showing that this unfitness is causing a harmful effect on the child. The
better view seems to be that due process forbids termination of parental
rights, a fundamental family-based right, absent a compelling interest
as evidenced by findings of harm to the child.
The fourteenth amendment substantive due process issue is best
discussed by first addressing the states' interests, then addressing the
parents' interests, and finally addressing the child's interests. Because
the following sections are organized conceptually in order to eliminate

48. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982).
49. 450 U.S. 382 (1981).
50. See Doe, 450 U.S. at 382. A closely related issue was before the Court recently. In In re
Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), cert. granted sub nor. Kirkpatrick v.
Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 459 U.S. 1145, vacated, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983), a biological
father was denied custody of his out-of-wedlock child under a Texas statute requiring the father
show legitimation is in the child's best interest if the mother does not consent to a biological
father's legitimation petition. The mother refused to consent to the petition because she felt that
adoption was the best option for the child. Id. at 263. The Texas Civil Court of Appeals rejected
both of the father's theories. First, the appeals court ruled that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that legitimation was not in the child's best interest because the statute furthers the best interest of an out-of-wedlock child. Id. Second, the court upheld the constitutional
validity of the statute despite attacks on both due process and equal protection grounds. The court
reasoned that the gender-based classification for establishing status as a parent is substantially
related to an important government interest in furthering the best interest of the child. Id. The
United States Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in the case based on constitutional questions presented. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 459 U.S. 1145 (1983). However,
the Court subsequently vacated and remanded the Texas decision for further resolution of statelaw questions. Specifically, the Court remanded for a determination of whether under Texas law,
the "petitioner could have obtained and may still obtain a decree designating him as the father of
his child
....
" Kirkpatrick
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the arguments for each of these parties, the footnote to this sentence
provides the substantive due process cases by state, so as to demonstrate which statutory language has been upheld.5 1
A.

States' Interests
The states' interest is based on the need for child protection when

51. It should be kept in mind that most of these state cases preceded the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Santosky, which was the first case that definitively stated that there is
a fourteenth amendment due process-based fundamental right to family integrity. See Santosky,
455 U.S. at 753 (parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their child); Alsager v. District Ct., 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g, 406 F. Supp. 10
(S.D. Iowa 1975) (parents were denied substantive due process where the state failed to prove the
threshold of harm essential to giving the state a sufficient compelling interest to justify termination of parental rights); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 444 F. Supp. 393
(D. Mass.) (Massachusetts statute that only requires showing of termination being in the child's
best interest, but fails to require a showing of parental unfitness, may be unconstitutional), ajfd,
584 F.2d 1103 (Ist Cir. 1978); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (right to family
integrity is a fundamental right so that Alabama provisions allowing termination of parental
rights upon a summary showing of neglect violated both the child's and the parents' constitutional
rights); Miller v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions and Sec., 374 So. 2d 1370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979),
(statutory language "best interest and welfare" of child upheld); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d
184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979) (statutory language allowing termination where the parent is not
able to care for the child because of mental illness was upheld despite the state's failure to demonstrate any acts of neglect or abuse); In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977) (statute containing
best interests standard without linking best interests to a showing of parental unfitness was upheld); People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. 2d 511, 121 N.E.2d 781 (1954) (upheld statute
that permitted termination of parental rights on the ground of parent's mental illness); Horlock v.
Oglesby, 249 Ind. 251, 231 N.E.2d 810 (1967), (statutory provision allowing the termination of
parental rights of fathers who failed to support their children despite the ability to do so upheld),
appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 718 (1968); In re Brookes, 228 Kan. 541, 618 P.2d 814 (1980) (failure to incorporate the doctrine of using the least restrictive alternative does not render the termination of parental rights statute unconstitutional); Winter v. Director, 217 Md. 391, 143 A.2d 81
(upheld statutory provision allowing termination of parental rights solely on ground of the best
interests of the child), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912 (1958); Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204,
208, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1981) (it is the "'generally accepted view
that a child's best interest [is to be] raised by its parent unless the parent is disqualified by gross
misconduct' ") (quoting In re Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 29 N.Y.2d 196, 204, 274 N.E.2d
43 1, 436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 944 (1971 ) (interests of parent and child ordinarily converge)); In re
Anonymous, 79 Misc. 2d 280, 359 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1974) (upheld provision that allows termination
of parental rights if parent is imprisoned); Ex parte Walters, 92 Okla. Crim. 1, 221 P.2d 659
(1950) (upheld statutory language that permitted termination if child was without proper care);
In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (upheld statute allowing termination of parental
rights on the ground of the parent's continued incapacity causing the child to be without essential
parental care and the inablility of alleviating the source of the incapacity even though the statute
did not require any showing of physical or verbal harm), cert. denied sub nom. Lehrman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs., 439 U.S. 880 (1978); State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ogle,
617 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (upheld statutory provision that allows appointment of
guardian ad litem in termination of parental rights proceedings for a child's parent who is judged
incompetent); Crawford v. Crawford, 569 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (upheld statutory
provision allowing termination of parental rights on the ground that the parent endangered the
child); In re R.J.M., 266 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1980) (upheld statute that did not require use of the
least restrictive alternative before terminating parental rights).
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parents fail to fulfill their role. It is estimated that each year there are
over 800,000 cases of child neglect and 200,000 cases of physical
abuse, resulting in the deaths of 2000 children. 51 Only a "distinct minority" of these cases involve actual child abuse 53 in the sense of the
child being intentionally beaten as opposed to being neglected. As a
result of abuse or neglect, over 30,000 children nationwide are removed
from their homes each year, particularly from poor families.5 4 Because
most of these children end up under foster care for extended periods of

52. See Note, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes Terminating Parental
Rights, 1980 DUKE L.J. 336, 337. Actually, the numbers may be much higher. Despite underreporting, estimates by child-protection organizations of how many American children are sexually
abused each year range from 100,000 to 1,000,000. See DeFrancis, Protecting the Child Victim of
Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1971, at 15, 17. Although the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reports at least 2,000 deaths, its estimate of the
number of abused children is over 1,000,000. See Schwartz & Hirsh, Child Abuse and Neglect: A
Survey of the Law, 1982 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 293, 295.
The American Humane Association's national study of child abuse reported 1,955 cases of
child sexual abuse in 1976. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1982, at CIO, col. 2. By 1980, that figure had
risen to approximately 25,000 and, contrary to what may have been believed, over 50% of these
incidents may have involved violence. See id. (quoting Dr. Gene G. Abel, Director of the Sexual
Behavior Clinic. New York State Psychiatric Institute at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center,
New York, N.Y.). A 1981 study done by the American Humane Association reported that
"[there were 850,980 reports of child abuse and neglect documented nationwide during 1981,
which represents an increase of 206 percent since 1976." AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION,
HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 20 (1981) (report available at
the American Humane Ass'n, Child Protection Division, 9725 East Hampden Avenue, Denver,
Colo. 80231) The U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect stated that about 1,000,000
children were reported as suspected child abuse or neglect cases in 1979. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERvs., NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND

(1981).
53. See Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 606,
609 (1973).
54. See Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A
Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. REV. 645, 660, 689 (1980). The
American Humane Association reports that "[t]he number of child abuse and neglect reports
processed by child protection service agencies in 1981 was 850,980." AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, supra note 52, at 20. In 1981, 48% of the cases were reported closed after the investigation; 44% were "open for protective services" and 5% were "currently under investigation." Id. at
21. Casework counseling was the most frequently provided service. 81% of the cases opened for
services received casework counseling while 43% received some type of long-term support services;
court action was initiated in 18% of the cases, and short-term crisis services were provided in 15%
of the cases. Id. 4% of the cases reported indicated that the only activity which had occurred was
the investigation by the protective services caseworker; however, services were expected or
planned. Id. Another study by a Denver child abuse team "found that in only 10 percent of their
cases, the children had to be permanently removed from the home. In the remaining 90 percent,
the children were returned to home within 8 or 9 months of the incident after both they and their
parents received treatment." Mondale, Child Abuse Symposium, Introductory Comments, 54
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 635, 637 (1980). The statistic that as many as 2,000 children die each year
was also discussed by former Vice President Walter Mondale. Id. at 636. Although the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reports at least 2,000 deaths, its estimate of the number
of abused
children is over
1,000,000. Schwartz & Hirsh, supra note 52, at 295.
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time, termination of parental rights is provided as a means of "freeing
55
the child for adoption."1

The states' role as superparent, commonly known as parens patriae,56 can be traced to English common law. In Eyre v. Shaftsbury5
the Court of Chancery explained that the King, as protector of all his
subjects, is concerned about those unable to care for themselves because of their youth or incapacities. 5 8 The modern concept of parens
patriae has several widely recognized justifications. First, because a
child by definition lacks capacity and experience, it is necessary that
someone else be ultimately responsible for the child's basic needs. An
obvious example is orphaned children.5 9 Second, because society as a
whole has a stake in the children who will soon be its adult citizens,
society has an interest in assuring the child's welfare as well as acculturation to its political values. Finally, a child who is not raised properly may later become a delinquent. Thus, parens patriae serves as the
historical doctrinal foundation for protecting young children from
abuse and neglect.
Modern theories of psychology lend additional weight to the historical doctrine of parens patriae. It is widely accepted that children
who are abused often become abusers, largely because that is the only
role model they have.60 Moreover, the psychiatrists Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit have written two influential books in
which they stress the need for maintaining the child's relationship with
the child's "psychological parent." ' Thus, they oppose removal of the
child from his or her family unless the child is in actual or serious
danger. Once a child has been removed from the home or voluntarily
placed in foster care, if a foster parent becomes established as the new
"psychological parent," Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would be opposed

55. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(b) (McKinney 1983). As one commentator asserts, "[although no one knows exactly how many proceedings are initiated, it appears that at
least 20,000 new petitions are filed annually." Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Counsel after Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 205 (1981).
56. Literally this term means father of the country. The term refers to the state's sovereign
power of guardianship over persons under disability. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed.
1979).
57. 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722). For an article on the history of parens patriae, see Note, The
Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effects on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27
U. PITT. L. REV. 894 (1966).

58. Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 666.
59. See. e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § I (West Supp. 1985).
60. See, e.g., Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 13,
1982, at CI0, col. I.
61. See J. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); J. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
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to reuniting the child with his or her natural parents.6 2 Although it is
not possible to determine exactly how long it takes to develop a psychological parent-child relationship, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit posit that
a child's sense of time is different than that of adults.6 3 At the point
that a child has developed a new "psychological parent," they would
require termination of the natural parents' rights in order to protect the
integrity of the new family, even if the reason for the initial disruption
of the natural family was not due to the fault of the parent. 64 Thus,
parental fitness is not the important criterion, and a parent who has lost
touch with his or her child because of a long illness is in no better
position than one who has been at fault. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
theories, despite having been adopted by several courts, 5 have also
been severely criticized 6 for a variety of reasons, especially for not using empirical data to support their psychoanalytic theories, for confusing the issue of separation with that of parental deprivation, and for
failing to recognize that a child may have several psychological
parents.
Apart from the common law and psychological theory, there is a
long constitutional tradition of state intervention into family life on the
behalf of children. Examples include compulsory education, 7 compulsory vaccination and medical treatment,68 and the prohibition of child
labor.6 9 The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts7 0 gracefully articulates the states' interest in regulating the
relationship between the parents and the child in order to protect the

62. See Wald, supra note 54, at 648-49.
63. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
8-10 (1973).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821
(1976); In re Kim Marie J., 59 A.D. 716, 398 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Katkin, Bullington & Levine, Above and Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child: An Inquiry Into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social Action, 8 L. &
Soc'y. REV. 669 (1974).
67. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
68. For example, states have been allowed to order blood transfusions over parents' religious
objections. See People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252
S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Hoener v.
Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); Santos v. Goldstein, 16 A.D.2d 755, 227
N.Y.S.2d 450, appeal dismissed, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1962); In re Brooklyn Hospital, 45 Misc.
2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1965); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Ct.
1962). A state can also impose a compulsory smallpox vaccination law under its police power. See
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II (1905).
69. See, e.g., Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920); In re Spencer,
149 Cal. 396, 86 P. 896 (1906); Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 87 N.E. 229 (1909);
New York v. Chelsea Jute Mills, 43 Misc. 266, 88 N.Y.S. 1085 (1904).
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Published70.by eCommons,
1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 1 1:3

child:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nuture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder ...
And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. But the family
itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest . . . . [RIights of
parenthood are [not] beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parents' control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
7
the child's labor and in many other ways.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the state may properly act to protect
72
children of tender years from parental neglect.
B.

Parents' Interests

In Santosky v. Kramer,7 3 the United States Supreme Court, for
the first time in the context of termination of parental rights, declared
that parents' "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment." 4I The Court further clarified this substantive due process interest of the parents, stating:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State . . . .The fact that important liberty interests of the
child and its foster parents may also be affected by a permanent neglect
proceeding does not justify denying the natural parents constitutionally
adequate procedures.

75

Thus, after Santosky, it is clear that the right to integrity of the family
is among the most fundamental rights under the Fourteenth
76
Amendment.
Prior to Santosky, cases such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters," in
which the Court declared unconstitutional a statute requiring parents
to send their children to public schools,7 were used by advocates both
in support of and in opposition to the establishment of a fourteenth
71. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
72. See id. at 166-67.
73. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
74. Id. at 753.
75. Id. at 754 n.7.
76. Id. at 753-54.
77. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
78. Id. at 534-35.
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amendment fundamental right to family integrity. Advocating the fundamental right to family integrity, the Court in Pierce stated: "The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only."'79 Those opposing the establishment of a fundamental right to

family integrity and the compelling state interest standard of review
which it triggers, argued that Pierce merely required a reasonable relationship test, pointing to language in that case which stated:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, .

.

. we think it entirely plain

that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.80
Assuming that Santosky has settled this debate on the side of a
fundamental right to family integrity, the key question for the attorney
representing the parents is what constitutes a state interest sufficient to
defease the parents' right to custody of their children. There is authority to support the contention that only the need to protect children from
neglect or harm is sufficient to permit intervention. According to the
United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois,81 "[t]he private
interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection.1 82 Thus, it seems that a practitioner representing a
parent seeking to retain custody, faced with a showing of parental misconduct without a showing that there is a resultant harm to the child,
has at least a strong argument that the parents should, nevertheless,
83
retain custody.
The main problem for an attorney in this position is that harm
may be difficult to prove or disprove. It may not be clear whether a
mother's right to her children may be terminated because she drinks
alcohol excessively or is living with someone to whom she is not married.84 Similarly, what is the status of a mother whose misconduct is

79. Id. at 535.
80. Id. at 534-35.
81. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
82. Id. at 651.
83. See. e.g., Dasovick v. A.B., 259 N.W.2d 636, 638 (N.D. 1977) ("A showing of parental
misconduct without a showing that there is resultant harm to the child is not sufficient.").
84. See, e.g., ILL..
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(D)(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) ("habitual
drunkenness or addiction to drugs"); id. § 1501(D)() ("open and notorious adultery or fornication").by
See
also In re Solomon,
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forging checks in order to buy things for her children? Because the
judge making the decision has much discretion, these cases are difficult
to predict.
The position of a California court in In re T.M.R., 85 provides an
example of how harm might be evaluated. In this case, the trial court's
order declaring an imprisoned mother's children free from her custody
and control was reversed when the court held that the neglect provision
was intended to apply only where a child was made a dependent of the
juvenile court because he or she had been cruelly treated or neglected,
and not to the situation where there was no one to care for the child
when his or her parents were arrested. 8 The federal district court case
of Alsager v. District Court 87 suggests a measure for how much harm
is enough harm to constitute a compelling state interest:
Due process requires a certain threshold of harm to the child to justify
termination. In this regard, the Court accepts plaintiffs' argument that
to sustain its compelling interest burden, the state must show that the
consequences, in harm to the children, of allowing the parent-child relationship to continue are more severe than the consequences of
termination.88
The Alsager test, that "more harm is likely to befall the child by staying with his [or her] parents than by being permanently separated from
them," 89 however, provides less protection for parents than the standards adopted by some state courts that focus on actual harm or present danger.9 0
It would probably be violative of the parents' rights to reach into
the hospital and remove a mother's newly-born child because of her

constitute a ground for termination if it is not likely to have an adverse effect on the welfare of the
child). But see Booth v. Heenepin County Welfare Bd., 253 Minn. 395, 91 N.W.2d 921 (1958)
(sexual immorality of mother who had relationships with married men was sufficient for termination of parental rights).
85. 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1974).
86. Id. at 700-01, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96.
87. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
88. Id. at 23.
89. Id. at 24.
90. See. e.g., Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 378 Mass. 712, 719, 393 N.E.2d 379, 384
(1979). The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
The gist of the appellant's argument is that a finding of parental unfitness and subsequent
transfer of child custody to the department must be based on evidence of existing neglect
or mistreatment and not merely on the fear, however well-founded, that a firstborn child
would suffer harm. Although we agree that there must be a finding of a current parental
unfitness before the State may assume custody of a child, .... we decline to restrict the
evidence in the manner that the appellant suggests.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 389 N.E.2d 68
(1979) (upheld removal of newborn from mother based on mistreatment of her other children).
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past behavior, but not necessarily in a situation in which she mistreated
her older children. 91 Usually, those courts willing to consider future
harm require the trial judge "to articulate his [or her] findings in regard to the emotional and physical welfare of the child in light of the
parent's alleged misconduct." 92 In one case, the evidence showed that a
thirteen-year-old boy was living with his mother in unconventional living conditions which included the mother and son sleeping next to each
other on a small rug.9 The court held that unless the state could prove
that the child was actually suffering or was likely to suffer physical or
emotional harm, there was no reason to disturb the basic security of the
family relationship.9 ' Similarly, in a Massachusetts case,95 the court
clearly indicated that a parent's problems must be listed in detail and
must be directly related to the child's safety and well-being.9
Thus, although it now appears clear that there is a fundamental
right to family integrity which triggers the compelling state interest
test, case law of individual states must be analyzed carefully in order to
discern what types of harm justify state intervention. 97 It is worth noting that at least one case held that parents' rights to custody of their
children is so axiomatic that it predates the state and the Constitution.9 8 On the other hand, the extent of constitutional protection for
parental interests in family integrity depends upon the facts and circumstances regarding the parent-child relationship. For example, foster
parents have a less-weighty interest 9 and natural parents who show no
continuing interest in their children may also receive less protection. 0 0
C.

Child's Interests

Generally, by the time the termination proceeding occurs, the
child already has been removed from the parents' home pursuant to a
91. See In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1974).
92. See. e.g., In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I. 1980).
93. Id. at 1038.
94. Id. at 1039.
95. Minor (No.2), 378 Mass. 712, 393 N.E.2d 379 (1979).
96. Id. at 712, 393 N.E.2d at 385.
97. For a list of state cases, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
98. See State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978). For an argument that the
state "does not need to grant parents authority they already have and which is, under our political
theory, prior to the state itself," see Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, and Protection: The Risks of Children's Rights, 63 A.B.A. J. 1383, 1388 (1977). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (the natural family has its "origins entirely
apart from the power of the State, whereas the foster family has its source in state law and
contractual arrangements.").
99. See. e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977). For a further discussion of Smith and the nature of the procedural due process rights
of roster parents, see infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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care and protection proceeding"'0 and has been placed in a temporary
foster home. 10 2 The purpose of the termination of parental rights proceeding is to free the child for adoption, thereby giving the child a
permanent home. This proceeding is necessary because the parents
have failed to rehabilitate themselves to the point where they can provide an adequate home. That the child's life will become more stable
3
after termination, however, "is a hazardous assumption at best.''
Even those children who eventually are adopted"0 4 may spend years in
state institutions or foster homes. 0 5 Therefore, in Santosky v. Kramer,
the United States Supreme Court described the child's interest as not
necessarily adverse to the parents. The parents and the child both share
an interest in avoiding erroneous termination.106 However, "[flor the
child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is
10 7
preservation of an uneasy status quo."1
Although an "uneasy status quo" is not ideal and usually involves
the child living in a foster home with the natural parents retaining only
visitation rights, children have a liberty interest in preserving their natural family. Psychiatrists have recognized that interference with the
emotional ties of unfit parents and their child may be extremely painful
for the child. 10 8 Thus, the family unit is also important to the child.
The effect of this state-imposed system of "protective" displacement of children from their parents is well summarized by Professor
Michael S. Wald:
It is now the prevailing ethic among child care experts that foster
care has been overused as a means of protecting children. Although still
widely used, foster care is considered generally to be a worse alternative
than leaving a child in the home. This negative attitude toward foster
care is based on several factors.
In part it rests on the theoretical work of child psychiatrists like
Anna Freud and John Bowlby asserting that separation from parents has

101. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533.5 (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(1) (1982 &
Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(5) (1981 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
571-61(b)(l)(E) (Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(3)(d) (Baldwin 1985).
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §
128:108 (1986).
103. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765 n.15. See also Smith, 431 U.S. at 837 ("[Elven when it is
clear that a foster child will not be returned to his natural parents, it is rare that he achieves a
stable homelife through final termination of parental ties and adoption into a new permanent
family.") (citations omitted).
104. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765 n.15
105. Id.
106. Id. at 765.
107. Id. at 765-66.
108. See Comment, Due Process and the Fundamental Right to Family Integrity: A ReEvaluation of South Dakota's Parental Termination Statute, 24 S.D.L. REV. 447 (1979).
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an extremely negative impact on children, even children from "bad"
homes. In addition, there is a substantial body of clinical findings identifying harms associated with foster care. It seems clear that most children
are strongly attached to their parents and that "so far as the child's emotions are concerned, interferences with [parental] tie[s], whether to a 'fit'
or 'unfit' psychological parent, [are] extremely painful." . ..
Moreover, children often view foster home placement as a punishment for something they did wrong ....
• ..The quality of foster parent homes also varies considerably...
Moreover, children in foster care frequently are subjected to multiple
placements, destroying the continuity and stability needed to help a child
achieve stable emotional development. This may, in fact, be the most
damaging aspect of foster care.
One other harm of foster care relates not to the endangered child
but to other children in the family. The removal of one child may make
the other children worry that they will be the next to go. 10 9
The notion that there is in fact a reciprocal bond between parent
and child that gives rise not only to the legal right of parents to raise
their children, but the right of children to be raised by their parents is
also strongly supported in contemporary professional literature. As one
writer concluded, after surveying the child development literature:
From the viewpoint of a child's psychological and emotional wellbeing and happiness, parental decisions enjoy major advantages over
those of outside authority . . . . [Tihe family is a relatively decentralized
and personalized institution that usually generates feelings of mutual
psychological attachment and trust among its members; the parents,
both as participants in and leaders of the family, are thus likely to receive the emotional support of their children. Moreover, the child, particularly when young, acquires his core of values and goals from his parents. "in the final analysis, the home represents the ultimate and
definitive repository of adult authority where he is concerned." Under
these circumstances, parental decisions and the values underlying them
are apt to reflect the child's judgments as well, thereby acquiring legitimacy in the child's eyes.'
Moreover, even children who are adopted at a young age suffer
some psychological harm from not knowing their natural parents."'

109. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal
of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Terminations. of Parental Rights. 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 644-46 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
110. Note, State Intrusioninto Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 1383, 1385-86 (1974) (quoting J. HORROCKS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 150 (3d
ed. 1970)).
III. See generally _. SOROSKY, _. BARRAN & -. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE
207-14 (1978); _. TRISELIOTIS. SEARCH OF ORIGINS (1973).
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Consequently, children have both a liberty and a psychological interest
to be raised by their natural parents, 112 as long as the harm caused by
the parents does not outweigh these interests.1 13

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION

Once it is determined that parties have a substantive due process
interest, the question always becomes: "What process is due?" There
are three major contexts in which procedural due process issues have
been litigated in relation to termination of parental rights. The first is
the void for vagueness problem. 1 4 Because there are so many ways in
which parents can harm their children, it is very difficult to draft a
termination of parental rights statute. Some statutes use general terms
like parental unfitness, while others attempt more specific lists of
grounds." 5 In recent years, there has been a trend toward describing
the grounds more specifically, most likely in order to withstand a fourteenth amendment due process vagueness attack.' A more complete
discussion of the vagueness issue will appear in the next major section.
The second major procedural due process issue involves the rights
of parents to be represented by counsel at termination of parental
rights hearings. According to the United States Supreme Court, in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services," 7 there is no constitutional
right to counsel, although thirty-three states and the District of Columbia do provide counsel for parents." 8 Lassiter, however, may be limited
to its very narrow factual setting which involved "a mother under [a]
lengthy sentence for murder who showed little interest in her son."" 9

See generally J. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
(1979).
113. See Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 23 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d
1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
114. See Doe v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382 (1981); Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10
(S.D. Iowa 1975), affid, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583
S.W.2d 37 (1979). For a more complete discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine, see infra
notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
115. See FAMILY LAW, supra note 10, ch. (chapter on termination of parental rights).
116. Id.
117. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
118. Id. at 34 (Stewart, J.).
119. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). The majority opinion emphasized: "The Court's opinion
today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now
widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise." Id.
Besides the 33 state statutes, lower federal courts and state courts have almost always found
a right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases. See, e.g.. Brown v. Grey, 476 F. Supp.
771 (D. Nev. 1979) (due process requires the state to appoint counsel whenever an indigent parent
is defending against termination of parental rights); V.F. v. Alaska, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983)
(where the rights of indigent parents were found even more compelling in a termination proceed112.

THE CHILD
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The mother had expressly declined to appear at an earlier custody
hearing and had not even bothered to consult with the attorney who
was retained to represent her.' 2 0
A third procedural due process issue involves the question of the
appropriate burden of proof to be applied at termination of parentalrights proceedings. Clear and convincing evidence was established as
the constitutionally mandated burden of proof by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer. 2 ' The Court reasoned that a termination of parental rights hearing not only infringes on a fundamental
liberty interest, but also seeks to end it.' 2 2 Therefore, the loss of parental rights would be grievous; moreover, the interest in reaching an accurate decision is high. 23 As such, the interest of the state in using a
peponderance standard was greatly outweighed by the interests of the
parents: "In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight."' 24 The Court's
holding was influenced by the imbalance in the ability of the state,
compared to that of the parent, to marshall its case. 25 The Court also
relied on the similarity between the fact-finding stage of a termination
hearing and a criminal trial.12 6 In addition, the Court noted that both

ing); Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979) (the Alaska constitution gives indigent parents
a right to appointed counsel); Shappy v. Knight, 251 Ark. 943, 475 S.W.2d 704 (1972); Danforth
v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347, 208
N.W.2d 259 (1973); In re C.M., 158 N.J. Super 585, 386 A.2d 913 (1978) (mother did not
clearly, convincingly, and intelligently waive her right to have counsel present at the signing of a
form authorizing termination of parental rights); Crist v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family
Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (1974), modified, 135 N.J. Super 537, 343 A.2d 815
(1975); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1978); State v. Jamison, 251 Or. 114, 444 P.2d 1005
(1968); In re R.I., 445 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1923); In re Hernandez, 25 Wash. App. 447, 607
P.2d 879 (1980) (at a voluntary relinquishment hearing, no procedural due process rights are
infringed by the failure to provide an attorney for the mother).
120. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21.
121. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
122. Id. at 759.
123. Id. at 761-64.
124. Id. at 758.
125. Id. at 763. The Court stated:
In appraising the nature and quality of a complex series of encounters among the agency,
the parents, and the child, the court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh probative
facts that might favor the parent. ...
The State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents' ability to
mount a defense.
Id. at 762-63.
126. Id. at 764.
Unlike criminal defendants, natural parents have no "double jeopardy" defense against
repeated state termination efforts. If the State initially fails to win termination, as New
York did here. . . . it always can try once again to cut off the parent's rights after gatherPublished by eCommons,
1985
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the child's and the parents' interests would be harmed by an erroneous
decision.1" Finally, the Court held that the clear and convincing evidence standard was in harmony with both the state's parens patriae
interest in "promoting the welfare of children" and in reducing administration costs. 128 Four justices dissented, warning against federal intervention in state family law. 129 Over thirty states had adopted the clear
and convincing evidence standard prior to Santosky"3 ° and the remainder are likely to change their laws in its wake, making the clear and
convincing evidence standard the norm.
Procedural due process issues have also arisen in the closely associated area of what procedural rights foster parents should have prior to
removal of a foster child from their home. In Smith v. Organization of
Foster Familiesfor Equality and Reform,1 31 it was determined that
while foster parents may have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the integrity of the foster family unit stemming from the psychological relationship with the child, the pre-removal procedures employed by the State of New York and the City of New York were
constitutionally sufficient. The plaintiffs, a group of foster parents, argued that they had a liberty interest as foster parents and that the
relevant provisions and regulations governing removal of the child from
the foster home provided insufficient protection of their fourteenth
amendment due process guarantees. 32 The state regulations at issue
provided that following a removal order, the foster parents were entitled to an administrative hearing; the removal order, however, was not
stayed pending the hearing 33 In addition, the City of New York allowed foster parents to receive a full trial-type hearing prior to removal

ing more or better evidence. Yet even when the parents have attained the level of fitness
required by the State, they have no similar means by which they can forestall future termination efforts.
Id. (citation omitted).
127. The Court emphasized:
For
[T]he parents and the child share an interest in avoiding erroneous termination ....
the child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of an
uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family. A standard that allocates
the risk of error nearly equally between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their
relative severity.
Id. at 765-66.
128. Id. at 766. The Court also noted that even a hearing to suspend a driver's license,
which is much less important than losing one's child, commands a clear and convincing burden of
proof. Id. at 767-68.
129. Id. at 770-91 (Rehnquist, J., Burger C. J., White, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 767. For a list of the state statutes and court decisions, see id. at 749 n.3.
131. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
132. Id. at 820.
133. Id. at 829-30. See N.Y. SoC. SERV. § 400 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
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if the child was being transferred to another foster home; this procedure was inapplicable when the child was to be returned to the natural
parents.1 3 The plaintiffs argued that these procedures insufficiently
protected their interests as foster parents. While the Court found that
the foster family is much more than "a mere collection of unrelated
individuals"' 1 35 because of the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association,' the Court also stated that there are
important distinctions between a foster family and a natural family.
The natural family has its own roots and authority, but the foster family is derivative of the power of the state because it is created by a
contract between the state and the family. 137 The Court also reasoned
that any procedural protection afforded the foster parents infringes on
the substantive liberty of the natural parents. 138 In upholding the
state's procedure for transferring a foster child, the Court refused to
find any deprivation of a due process liberty interest where foster parents were provided with a pre-removal conference and post-removal
hearing whenever a child had been placed with foster parents for eighteen months or longer.' 39 In short, the Court held that nonnatural parents, as third-party custodians, acquire rights only derivatively by virtue of the child's best interests being considered. 1" '
In addition to procedural due process arguments involving vagueness, right to counsel, burden of proof, and the right of foster parents to
pre-removal notice, other issues often arise. A New York case held that
it was a denial of due process not to allow the natural mother to testify
on her own behalf at a termination proceeding.' 4' A Utah case held
that the informality of the termination of parental rights proceeding
does not permit the abridgement of basic constitutional provisions of
due process, especially the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and
to rebut evidence. 4 2 Other procedural due process theories that have
been raised, albeit unsuccessfully, include denial of notice of appeal,' 43
denial of attendance at the termination hearing, 44 and denial of a sep-

134. Smith, 431 U.S. at 831. See New York City Human Resources Administration, Department of Social Services-Special Services for Children, SSC Procedure No. 5 (Aug. 5, 1974).
135. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-45.
136. Id. at 844.
137. Id. at 845-46.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 847-56.
140. Id. at 838-47.
141. In re Roy Anthony A., 59 A.D.2d 662, 398 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1977).
142. State ex rel. S_
J_,
576 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978).
143. See In re Shutts, 29 Or. App. 121, 563 P.2d 1221, affd, 30 Or. App. 909, 569 P.2d 26
(1977) (no due process requirement of service of notice of appeal).
144. See In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979) (an unmarried, incarcerated father did
not have the right to be personally present at the termination of parental rights hearing because
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arate dispositional hearing. " " The most common of these alternative
due process theories, however, is that the statute creates an irrebutable
presumption. For example, in a 1976 California case, the appellate
court found that a statutory provision that allowed a presumption to
arise out of the failure of the mother to communicate with the child for
" 6 The court reaa period of six months did not violate due process.
soned that intent to abandon the child may be presumed because of the
lack of communication. 4 In fact, it would be easy to rebut the presumption merely by maintaining communication. Therefore, the inference is both rebuttable and logically related to the intent to abandon
the child. Several other courts have ruled on similar cases involving

presumptions.' 48

he was represented by counsel).
145. See In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (no constitutional violation for
failure to provide a separate dispositional hearing where the ground for termination of parental
rights was mental illness), modified, 83 A.D.2d 925, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1981), affid, 57 N.Y.2d
636, 439 N.E.2d 870, 454 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1982).
146. In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal Rptr. 338 (1976).
147. Id. at 419, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
148. See, e.g., In re Michele C., 64 Cal. App. 3d 818, 135 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1976) (provision
allowing termination of parentai rights of natural parent convicted of a felony is constitutional "if
the felony of which such parent or parents were convicted is of such nature as to prove the unfitness of such parent or parents to have the future custody and control of the child"); People v. Ray,
88 II1. App. 3d 1010, 411 N.E.2d 88 (1980) (where parent had been convicted of causing the
death by abuse of one child, the irrebuttable presumption of unfitness served a compelling state
interest), appeal dismissed. 452 U.S. 956 (1981). Keeney v. Prince George's County Dep't of
Social Servs., 43 Md. App. 688, 406 A.2d 955 (1979) (statute did not create an irrebuttable
presumption violative of incarcerated father's rights because it provided for rebuttal of the presumption given delineated circumstances); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich. App. 377, 210 N.W.2d 482
(1973) (statutory provision found unconstitutional because inadequate nexus between the proven
fact that the child was temporarily outside the custody of the parent and the presumed fact that
the situation warranted permanent termination of parental rights); In re Anonymous, 104 Misc.
2d 985, 429 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sur. Ct. 1980) (termination of parental rights based solely on imprisonment for a felony conviction does not infringe due process rights). But see In re Miller, 105
Misc. 2d 41, 430 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Fain. Ct. 1980) (lumping paroled prisoners with incarcerated
prisoners so as to preclude parolees from participating in decisions concerning their children's
custody violates due process rights).
But cf. In re Millar, 35 N.Y.2d 767, 320 N.E.2d 865, 362 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1974) (mem.) (the
termination order was affirmed but the court of appeals noted that it would be preferable to have
more evidence of the connection between the parent's mental illness and the ability to take care of
the child).
For an interesting article on the use of presumptions for determining the fitness of mentally
retarded parents, see generally Note, The Constitutionality of New York's Parental Termination
Statute as Applied to the Mentally Retarded Parent: Equal Protection and Due Process Objections, 46 ALM. L. REv. 271 (1981). This student commentator stated:
In addition, welfare agencies and courts may not irrebuttably presume that members
of a particular class of parents are inadequate and neglectful unless the characterization is
founded on fact and is true of all parents in that class. An irrebuttable presumption that all
mentally retarded parents neglect their children is based upon mistaken and archaic notions about mentally retarded people. The label "mentally retarded" denotes a group of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4

19861

DISSOLVING FAMILY RELATIONS

The equal protection clause, which prohibits statutes from treating
similarly situated people or activities discriminatorily, 1' 9 has also been
used to attack termination of parental rights statutes. These cases have
involved a variety of theories including discrimination against unwed
fathers on the basis of gender,1 5 and against natural parents on the
basis of imprisonment,1 51 on the basis of mental illness or mental retardation, 2 on the basis of poverty," a and on the basis that the child was

people who have the common characteristic of lower levels of intellectual functioning than
the average person. Contrary to popular belief, mentally retarded people are not similar in
all areas of functioning. A significant number of social scientists, psychologists and other
professionals agree that some mentally retarded parents can provide adequate care for their
children. Empirical studies show that mental retardation does not preclude a person from
performing necessary parenting skills. The equal protection clause has been interpreted to
invalidate legislative notions of role-typing. It is both professionally and legally impermissible to classify all mentally retarded persons alike. Therefore, a presumption that all mentally retarded parents neglect their children is unfounded, and a statute based on this premise is unacceptable.
Id. at 286-87 (footnotes omitted). See also Prygoski, When a Hearing Is Not a Hearing: Irrebuttable Presumptions and Termination of Parental Rights Based on Status, 44 U. PITT. L. REV.
879 (1983).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
150. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (termination statute found to be
an unconstitutional denial of the unwed father's equal protection rights); Miller v. Miller, 504
F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974) (termination statute held to be an unconstitutional denial of the unwed
father's equal protection rights); J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862
(1979) (unmarried, natural father, no alleged discrimination); In re Coffee, 59 Cal. App. 3d 593,
130 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1976) (natural father wins because there was no showing that his failure to
support was willful, thus no decision on equal protection issue); In re Ahmed, 44 Cal. App. 3d
810, 118 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975) (no denial of equal protection because grounds for terminating
fathers' rights are different from those for terminating mothers' rights); In re Patti Ann N., 104
Misc. 2d 263, 428 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Fain. Ct. 1980) (court found there was a deprivation of the
natural father's rights and declared the statute unconstitutional); In re Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360
A.2d 603 (1976) (court declared that the statute was an unconstitutional denial of natural father's
rights on discrimination theory).
151. See, e.g., Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d 23 (father in prison, the
statute is upheld), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 872 (1981); In re Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d
168 (1982) (statute upheld; unmarried incarcerated father who had never supported the child); In
re Miller, 105 Misc. 2d 41, 430 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (declared statute unconstitutional as applied to parolees but not as applied to parents still in prison); In re Guardianship
____
. 107 Misc. 2d 900, 436 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (upheld statute; imprisoned
parent).
152. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 27 Ariz. App. 420, 555
P.2d 679 (1976) (mentally ill parent; no denial of equal protection); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d
623, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1972) (upheld statute; poverty and mental illness); In re J.C., 242 Ga.
737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (statute authorizing termination of parental rights of parent whose only
shortcoming is lack of mental ability to give necessary care to the child does not violate the right
of equal protection), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Crane v. Carroll County of Family & Children
Servs., 441 U.S. 929 (1978); Helvey v. Rednour, 86 III. App. 3d 154, 408 N.E.2d 17 (1980)
(statute that provided for termination of parental rights of mentally ill parent who is not likely to
recover in the foreseeable future held unconstitutional violation of mother's equal protection
rights); In re Atkins, 112 Mich. App. 528, 316 N.W.2d 477 (1982) (upheld statute; mental illness); In re Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (upheld statute; mental illness), modiPublished
by eCommons, 1985
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already in foster care.""
In conclusion, constitutional defenses to termination of parental
rights cases appear to be much more common than statutory defenses.
Both substantive and procedural due process theories are frequently
raised. As illustrated by the above discussion, a plethora of procedural
due process theories have developed. Because the right of parents to the
care and custody of their children is so fundamental to our legal system, it is likely that new variations of these constitutional theories will
be heard for many years.1 5 However, while these theories are of fairly
recent vintage, one constitutional argument that is now firmly entrenched is that a statute is void for vagueness.
IV.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS

Because termination of parental rights statutes are often phrased
generally,1 5 they are especially prone to void for vagueness attacks.
The constitutionally objectionable aspect of a vague statute is that it
fails to provide sufficient notice to a potential offender regarding the
types of behavior that will result in legal sanctions.
There are two established tests for vagueness. The first test is

fled, 83 A.D.2d 925, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1981), aft'd, 57 N.Y.2d 636, 439 N.E.2d 870, 454
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1982); In re Ursula P., 108 Misc. 2d 181, 437 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Fam. Ct. 1981)
(upheld statute; mental illness); In re N. Children, 107 Misc. 2d 763, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Fam.
Ct. 1981) (upheld statute; mentally ill or mentally retarded); In re Daniel A.D., 106 Misc. 2d
370, 431 N.Y.S.2d 936 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (upheld statute; mentally ill or mentally retarded); In re
Gross, 102 Misc. 2d 1073, 425 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (court applied strict scrutiny to
declare statute unconstitutional; mentally ill or mentally retarded); State Dep't of Human Servs.
v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. 1980) (upheld statute; mental illness). See also Note, supra
note 148. The author commented on the applicability of New York's termination statute to retarded parents:
In conclusion, by failing to require support services before terminating parental rights
due to mental retardation, section 384-b is not drawn as the least burdensome alternative.
In effect, the statute punishes parents for their mental status by allowing parental rights to
be terminated without a showing of fault. Therefore, section 384-b violates equal protection
under a strict scrutiny test.
Id. at 287 (footnotes omitted). See also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-6 (McKinney 1983 & Supp.
1986); Note, Terminating Parental Rights: Mental Illness Disquised as Permanent Neglect, In re
Hime Y., 2 PACE L. REV. 125 (1983).
153. See In re Eugene W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1972) (upheld statute;
poverty and mental illness); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 425 A.2d 939 (1979) (upheld
statute; poverty); In re Bibbers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981) (upheld statute;
poverty).
154. See In re Carl N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fam. Ct. 1977) (upheld statute which contained different criteria for terminating the parental rights of parents whose children
were already in foster care than for those who had retained custody of their children).
155. One case even raised a right to privacy theory. See id. (parents' right of privacy outweighed by state's interest in the well-being of the child).
156. See supra notes 186-231 and accompanying text for a discussion of the grounds for
termination of parental rights.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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known as the common intelligence, common knowledge, or ordinary intelligence test.157 While the common intelligence test appears to be appropriate when non-fundamental rights are implicated, the second test
appears to be more appropriate when constitutional rights, like the fundamental right to family integrity, are at issue.
The second test was established by the United States Supreme
Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford,15 8 a first amendment case which
attempted to identify the important values offended by vague laws. The
first prong of the test is synonymous with that of the ordinary intelligence test-notice: "First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give a person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro159
hibited, so that he may act accordingly.'
While the first important value identified by Grayned is to avoid
trapping the innocent by giving notice, the second is to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Lack of explicit standards impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to state enforcement officials
for resolution on a case by case, subjective basis. 60
The third important branch of the Grayned test is concerned with
an "inhibit[ion]. . .of [protected] freedoms." '' Just as an ordinance
may permit persons to be punished for merely expressing unpopular
views, a termination of parental rights statute may permit parents to be
punished for merely having an unconventional lifestyle. Thus, it is possible that a vague statute will produce a "chilling effect" on constitutionally protected lifestyles.
The Doe v. Delaware162 case provided a good setting for an application of the Grayned test to a termination statute because it involved
the only termination of parental rights statute that reached the United
States Supreme Court on the vagueness issue. At issue was a Delaware
statutory provision that permitted termination of parental rights upon a
finding that the parents were "not fitted"'' 6 3 and that a termination
would be in the child's "best interests.""' Neither the term "not fitted"
nor the term "best interests" were defined anywhere in the Delaware

157. The landmark case applying this test to a civil statute is Small v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1925) (federal statute prohibiting the sale of sugar at unjust,
unreasonable, and excessive prices, was "unintelligible" because the market value of sugar is subject to fluctuation).
158. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
159. Id. at 108.
160. Id. at 108-09.
161. Id. at 109.
162. 450 U.S. 382 (1981).
163. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(4) (1975) (amended 1980).
164. See id. § 1108(a) (1975) (amended 1983).

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 1 1:3

Code, nor was the statutory vagueness cured by judicial construction.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, by dismissing the case
on jurisdictional grounds,16 5 failed to address the vagueness issue.
In acknowledgment of the difficulty of foreseeing all the conceivable ways in which parents may be "unfitted for parental duties," most
states avoid this definitional problem as well as the constitutional notice
problem by providing for a "child neglect" or "child dependency" proceeding at which the shortcomings of the parent are specifically identified."' 6 In cases where such provisions have been held to be constitutional as applied, the parent was invariably given definite information
as to particular complaints against him or her and what was required
to avoid termination of parental rights.167 For example, in a 1977 Iowa
Supreme Court case, 6 8 welfare workers had been counseling the
mother for over five years. The juvenile court approved an ultimatum
nine months prior to the termination proceedings and specifically set
out the conditions that the mother had to meet in order to avoid termination of her parental rights. These conditions included maintaining sobriety, retaining employment, and other conditions which were necessary to properly performing her parental responsibilities."6 9 As the
mother had adequate notice of her responsibilities under the statute,
the supreme court ruled against her constitutional argument.

165. Doe, 450 U.S. at 382.
166. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(a)(2) (Page Supp. 1985). For a fuller
discussion of dependency and neglect proceedings, see generally FAMILY LAW, supra note 10.
167. See Miller v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions and Sec., 374 So. 2d 1370 (Ala. Civ. App.
1979) (statutory words "unfit," improper," "neglect," allegedly vague; statute upheld because juvenile court judge and Department of Pensions and Security told mother specifically what she had
to do); In re V.A.E.Y.H., 199 Colo. 148, 605 P.2d 916 (1980) (statutory language that home was
"injurious" to "welfare" of child was allegedly vague; statute upheld because mother had received
a specific list of conduct deemed "injurious" over one year prior to the termination proceeding); In
re Souza, 204 Neb. 503, 283 N.W.2d 48 (1979) (upheld statute); In re J.F.C., 577 P.2d 1300
(Okla. 1978) (upheld statute providing for an order stating specific deficiencies six months prior to
final termination); In re Keyes, 574 P.2d 1026 (Okla. 1977) (statutory language "care and protection necessary for the child's physical and mental health" upheld against vagueness attack because
terms have common meaning and parents had specific knowledge of alleged deficiencies for over a
six-month period), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 804 (1978); State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486
P.2d 567 (1971) (statute constitutional because mother continued behavior that she was specifically warned would result in the termination of her parental rights); In re William L., 477 Pa.
322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) (statute constitutional because state has
burden of showing that parent had notice but failed to change conditions anyway); Sanchez v.
Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (upheld statute); McGowen v. State, 558 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (upheld statute); In re Aschauer, 93
Wash. 2d 689, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980) (statutory language "proper parental control" or "proper
maintenance, training and education," not unconstitutionally vague because mother had been
given specific information about what conduct was prohibited).
168. In re Hochmuth, 251 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1977).
169. Id. at 489.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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On the other hand, statutes have been found to be unconstitutionally vague as applied where court orders have not clarified the parents'
deficiencies more specifically than the statute. For example, one
court 1 ' found that the mother's failure to attend counseling sessions at
the department of social services could not be a basis for termination of
parental rights because the court's order in adjudication of neglect contained no directions for the parent to follow so that she might correct
the problems leading to termination. 17 1 Similarly, in another case, 17 2 a

court overturned a termination of parental rights order because the
prior adjudication did not give the mother notice of the conditions giving rise to the order. The court noted that "mere confinement in a
mental hospital, while necessitating custody of a child being placed
elsewhere, does not constitute failure to give a child the necessary parental care or protection required for his mental or physical health. '1 73
Finally, a federal district court, in declaring a state's statute unconstitutional, reasoned that the parents "were not given a factual basis from
which to predict how they should modify past conduct, their 'parenting', to avoid termination."1 7 '
Courts may also find that the words "unfit" and "best interest,"
without further elaboration or definition either in the statute, court order, or plan made by the parents and social services agency, fail to
provide sufficient notice. For example, one state supreme court
complained:
What is a proper home? A correct home? A suitable home? A fit home?
An appropriate home? A home consistent with propriety? Is propriety to
be determined ethically, socially, or economically? Or on the basis of
morality? Or prosperity? Is the standard a maximum, a minimum, a
7
mean or an average?
At least one federal judge has been similarly dismayed:
When is a home an "unfit" or "improper" place for a child? Obviously,
this is a question about which men and women of ordinary intelligence
would greatly disagree. Their answers would vary in large measure in
relation to their differing social, ethical, and religious views. Because

170. In re Crooks, 262 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1978).
171. Id. at 788-89.
172. In re Baby Girl Williams, 602 P.2d 1036 (Okla. 1979).
173. Id. at 1040.
174. Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 20 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd
per curian. 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
175. Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 122, 583 S.W.2d 37, 43 (1979). Accord Linn v. Linn,
205 Neb. 218, 286 N.W.2d 765 (1980) (Nebraska termination of parental rights statute declared
unconstitutionally vague under the ordinary intelligence test because it failed to define "best interests and
welfare of children.").
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these terms are too subjective to devote a sufficient warning to those individuals who might be affected by their proscription, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.' 76
The quotations above not only illustrate the first danger of vagueness, insufficient notice, but also the second danger-broad delegation
7
of highly discretionary decision making to enforcement officials.' The
high probability of arbitrary enforcement is also illustrated by a study
that analyzed the factors influencing the decision whether to provide a
child with certain services within the child's own home or remove the
child to foster care.178 In this study, three child welfare professionals,
each of whom had a minimum of five years experience, were given the
same files for ninety-four children. Each was asked to decide whether
the child should be removed from parental custody. The three child
79
welfare professionals agreed in less than one-half of the cases.1 More
importantly, when each was asked to indicate the factors that influenced his or her decision, they did not even identify the same factors as
being significant.' 80
Consequently, what is in the child's "best interests" usually depends on who is making the decision. As one author noted:
Indeterminate standards also pose an obviously greater risk of violating the fundamental precept that like cases should be decided alike.
Because people differ and not two custody cases are exactly alike, the
claim can be made that no process is more fair than one requiring resolution by a highly individualized, person-oriented standard. But with an
indeterminate standard, the same case presented to different judges may
easily result in different decisions. The use of an indeterminate standard
means that state officials may decide on the basis of inarticulated (perhaps unconscious) predictions and preferences that could be questioned if
expressed. Because of the scope of discretion under such a standard,
there is a substantial risk that decisions will be made on the basis of
values not widely shared in our society, even among judges.' 8'

176. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
177. The cases enumerated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972),
in support of this danger of arbitrary enforcement are not confined to first amendment cases. See
L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978). Professor Tribe wrote: "[A] vague law
need not reach activity protected by the first amendment. . . . [T]his indefiniteness runs afoul of
due process concepts which require . . . that the discretion of law enforcement officials, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary enforcement, be limited by explicit legislative standards." Id.
178.

See _. PHILLIPS,

-.

SHYNE. -.

SHERMAN & _. HARING, FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH

69-84 (1971) [hereinafter cited as _. PHILLIPS].
179. Id.
180. See R. MNOOKIN. CHILD. FAMILY AND STATE 490 (1978) (discussing _. PHILLIPS,
supra note 178).
181. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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Thus, alleging discriminatory enforcement may be a good defense for a
parent at a termination of parental rights proceeding or at its appeal.
Moreover, at least one federal court applied "chilling effect" analysis in
a termination of parental rights case involving an allegedly vague statute. 1 82 The federal court for the southern district of Iowa feared that
the fundamental right to family integrity might be chilled by causing
people to change their lifestyle in order to conform with the values of
the state enforcement officials. 183 This too may be a valuable defense
for an attorney defending a parent in a termination of parental rights
proceeding. On the other hand, more specifically worded statutes, such
as California's, 8 4 appear to be less susceptible to a void for vagueness
attack. There is the danger, however, that a statute that is worded too
specifically may "hamstring" the mechanisms created to protect children because the particular abusive or harmful conduct of certain parents is not specified in the statute. Because of the wide variety of statutory language as well as the broad judicial discretion accorded the
application of the statutes to individual facts, it is necessary to research
carefully the cases in a particular jurisdiction.18 5
182. Alsager, 406 F. Supp. 10, 18 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd per curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1976).
183. Id. at 18-19.
184. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1986). Section 232 provides for termination
of parental rights if (I) there is a failure to communicate with or support the child with the intent
on the part of the parent to abandon the child; (2) there has been a dependency proceeding in
which the child was found to have been cruelly treated or neglected and the child has been in
foster care for at least one year prior to the termination proceeding; (3) if the parent suffers a
disability defined as physical or mental incapacity which renders the parent unable to adequately
care for the child because of habitual use of alcohol or any controlled substance; (4) the parent is
convicted of a felony and the crime of which such parent was convicted is of such a nature as to
prove the unfitness of such a parent to have the future custody of the child; or (5) the parent has
been certified to be mentally deficient or mentally ill by either the State Director of Health (or his
equivalent) or by the testimony of two physicians and the mental defect is found to render the
parent incapable of supporting or controlling the child. Id. § 232(a).
185. See Syrovatka v. Erlich, 608 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding rejection of untimely
challenge to adoption proceeding dispute evidence of inadequate notice), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
935 (1980); Roe, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("no proper parental care" held unconstitutionally vague); Alsager, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976);
Lovell v. Department of Pensions and Sec., 356 So. 2d 188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (21 days' notice
is adequate); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979) ("a proper home" declared
unconstitutionally vague); Marten v. Thies, 99 Cal. App. 3d 161, 160 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1979), application denied. 446 U.S. 1320 (because of "imminent danger" to child if notice was given, removal
of a child from the home of pre-adoptive parents without prior written notice did not violate
procedural due process), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980); In re Sherman M., 39 Cal. App. 3d
40, 113 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1974) ("habitually intemperate" not unconstitutionally vague); In re
Melkonian, 152 Cal. App. 2d 250, 313 P.2d 52 (1957) (felony of such a nature as to prove unfitness, not unconstitutionally vague); In re C.S., 200 Colo. 1304, 613 P.2d 1304 (1980) ("best
interests and welfare of the child" not unconstitutionally vague); In re D.A.K., 198 Colo. II, 596
P.2d 747 (not unconstitutionally vague to provide termination of parental rights of a parent who
has subjected the child to "mistreatment and abuse"), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 987 (1979); In
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STATUTORY GROUNDS AND PROCEDURES

Probably in anticipation of or in reaction to fourteenth amendment

re Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. 1979) (language "not fitted" not unconstitutionally
vague), juris. noted, 445 U.S. 942 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 382 (1981); In re J.S.R.,
374 A.2d 860 (D.C. App. 1977) ("best interests of the child" not unconstitutionally vague); In re
Camm, 294 So. 2d 318 (Fla.) (not unconstitutionally vague because of statute's failure to give a
specific list of grounds for termination), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974); Chandler v. Cochran,
247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d 23 (upheld language allowing termination of parental rights if parent
failed to provide financial support after divorce), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872 (1981); Helvey v.
App. 3d 154, 408 N.E.2d 17 (1980) (statute permits consent by guardian ad
Rednour, 86 Ill.
litem if parent suffers from mental retardation and is not likely to recover in the foreseeable
App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975) (upheld "unfitness" standard
future); In re Ladewig, 34 Ill.
as not being unconstitutionally vague); Abell v. Clark County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, - Ind.
App. - 407 N.E.2d 1209 (1980) (service of process by publication is constitutionally insufficient notice where social service agency knows the parent's address); In re Kelly, 262 N.W.2d 781
(Iowa 1978) (unconstitutional for lack of notice to terminate parental rights on the ground of
abandonment when that ground did not appear in the pleadings); In re Brooks, 228 Kan. 541, 618
P.2d 814 (1980) ("unfit" not unconstitutionally vague; statute valid as construed); Linn, 205 Neb.
218, 286 N.W.2d 765 (1980) (subsection allowing guardian ad litem to determine that best interests of child required termination of parental rights declared unconstitutionally vague); In re Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 279 N.W.2d 374 (1979) (inability to perform parental responsibilities and
provide proper parental control not unconstitutionally vague); In re D.L.H., 198 Neb. 444, 253
N.W.2d 283 (1977) (upheld statute allowing termination of parental rights on grounds of habitual
use of intoxicating liquor or drugs resulting in detriment to the child's health, morals, or wellbeing); State ex. rel. Health & Social Services Dep't v. Natural Father, 93 N.M. 222, 598 P.2d
1182 (1979) (lack of statutory definition of "care and control" not unconstitutionally vague); In re
Sylvia M., 82 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214, modified, 83 A.D.2d 925, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214, aff'd,
57 N.Y.2d 636, 439 N.E.2d 870, 454 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1982) (not unconstitutionally vague when
statute allows termination because mental illness of parents puts children in danger of becoming
neglected or without proper care); In re Anthony L. "CC", 48 A.D.2d 415, 370 N.Y.S.2d 219
(1975) (permanent neglect provision upheld where no parental plan and child in custody of Department of Social Services for the statutory one-year period); In re Carl N., 91 Misc. 2d 738,
398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1977) (failure to plan for child's future does not mean to conceptualize a plan,
but to effectuate it, so statute's requirement of a plan, as construed, was not unconstitutionally
vague); In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971) (phrase "without proper parental care or control"
not unconstitutionally vague); In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1980) (it is unconstitutional to
fail to give parents adequate notice of conditions that must be corrected); State ex rel. Juvenile
Dep't of Multnomah County v. Wade, 19 Or. App. 314, 527 P.2d 753 (1974), appeal dismissed.
423 U.S. 806 (1975) (upheld statute allowing termination because of unfitness due to mental
illness); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (not unconstitutionally vague to allow
termination of parental rights when parent "has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control, or sustenance necessary for his physical or mental well being" and if the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent), cert. denied sub nom. Lehrman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 439 U.S. 880
(1978) and Beatty v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 439 U.S. 880 (1978); In re B.E., 287
N.W.2d 91 (S.D. 1979) ("neglected" and "dependent" are not unconstitutionally vague); In re
V.D.D., 278 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1979) (upheld phrase "proper care" as not unconstitutionally
vague); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975) (upheld constitutionality of statute
despite vagueness attack); State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1980) (statute allowing guardian to consent to adoption not unconstitutionally vague); Gonzalez v.
Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
904 (1980) (upheld language that permits termination if parent allows the child to be subjected to
known danger); D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1975) ("endanger[ing] the physical or emohttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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due process problems, almost half of the states amended their termination of parental rights statutes between 1974 and 1980.188 Currently,
abandonment is the most common ground for termination.'8 7 It may
not be necessary to demonstrate intent to abandon.18 8 Six months is
generally sufficient to establish abandonment.' 89 In a few states, the

tional well-being of the child" is not unconstitutionally vague standard); In re Neglected Child,
130 Vt. 525, 296 A.2d 250 (1972) ("without proper parental care" not unconstitutionally vague);
In re Hernandez, 25 Wash. App. 447, 607 P.2d 879 (1980); In re R.J.M., 266 S.E.2d 114 (W.Va.
1980) (no need to use less restrictive alternative); In re A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d 91, 312 N.W.2d 840
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (upheld statute allowing termination if child is without proper parental
care).
186. See Coleman, Standards for Termination of Parental Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 315,
328 (1980). Over half of the statutes were amended between 1970 and 1975. See Katz, Howe &
McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L. Q. 67 (1975). According to Katz, Howe,
and McGrath, the most frequently appearing grounds in 1975 for terminating parental rights were
abandonment (37 statutes), neglect (35 statutes), parental consent (24 statutes), and parental
moral unfitness (20 statutes). Id.
187. The following statutes list "'abandonment" of a child as a ground for termination of
parental rights: ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8533(B)(1) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(D) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §
232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-111(3), 19-11-105(i)(a) (1978 & Supp.
1985): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a(a)(l)(b) (West 1975 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1103(3) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2354(b)(1) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(1)
(West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-51(a)(1) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(a) (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(l)(D)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8
(West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(d) (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(1)(a)
(Baldwin 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.221(b)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(a) (Supp.
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3609(l)(b) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(l) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1) (1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(i) (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-36 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(l)(a) (1974); OLKA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(2) (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(4) (1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2511 (a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1986) (the court need only find failure "to perform parental duties"; no specific finding of abandonment necessary); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(d)
(Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(c)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 26-8-36 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(c) (Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
15.02(l)(G) (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(I)(b) (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(12)(A) (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(D) (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.34.030(2)(a) (West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(b)(4) (Supp. 1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN. 48.415(l) (West Supp. 1985); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
188. As the following statutes show, it is not always necessary to prove intent to abandon
the child for the purposes of termination of parental rights: CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(I) (West
Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(2) (Baldwin 1985); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
712A.19a(b) (West Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(I) (1978); N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW § 384-b(5)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1983).
189. The following statutes require a minimum showing of acts and omissions that amount
to abandonment for a period of no more than six months: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(1)
(Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(D)(2) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(1)
(Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(1) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2354(b)(1)
(1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 712A.19a(b) (Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(a)
(Supp. 1985) (if the child is less than three years old); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(1) (Vernon
Supp.by
1986);
MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-102(3)(d) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(l) (1984);
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actions or omissions amounting to abandonment may be manifested by
the parent for a period of less than six months. 90
A ground closely related to abandonment is physical incapacity.
This ground may be stated generally or more specifically. When stated
more specifically, it usually includes alcohol and drug addiction 9' or
92
incarceration for as little as two years.1
Apart from the separation caused by imprisonment, the mere fact
of conviction of a crime, especially one that is related to the care of
children, may be sufficient ground for termination of parental rights
under some statutes.'9 3 Termination statutes also include non-criminal

NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.012(2) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(l) (1978); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-7-36(A)(2) (Supp. 1985) (three months if under six years of age; six months if over six

years of age); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §
419.523(4) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2511(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1986) (need find only
failure "to perform parental duties" for six months-no specific finding of abandonment necessary); R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-7-7(d) (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-36 (1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(1)(b) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(D)(2) (Supp. 1985);
WIs. STAT. ANN.

§ 48.415(I)(a)(2) (Supp. 1985).

190. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(1) (Supp. 1985) (four months); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
48.415(I)(a)(I)-(2) (West Supp. 1985) (60 days in some instances; six month minimum in other
instances); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-301 (Supp. 1985) (3 months).
191. ARK. STAT ANN. §§ 56-128(B), (E) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(2)(e) (1978 & Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 1501(D)(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(3) (Supp. 1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1601(F)(2) (West 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(d)(i) (Supp.
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(H) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3609(2)(d) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(4) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.106(3) (1986);
N.Y.SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(d)(i) (McKinney 1983) (the affected parent must be hospitalized as a result); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(2)(c) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(3) (Supp.
1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(e)(4) (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(I)(a)(iii)
(Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B)(2)(b) (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(b)(l) (Supp.
1986).
192. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(4) (Supp. 1985) ("a period of years"); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(2)(g) (1973) ("long-term confinement of the parent"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-609(2)(e) (1985) ("long term confinement"); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(1) (Supp.
1985) ("extended period"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-I-102(I)(B)(i) (Supp. 1985) ("more that two
(2) years"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985) ("at least 2 years within the
[preceding] 5 years"); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) (Supp. 1985) ("incarcerated for conviction
of a felony"). See also Walker v. Ramsey County Welfare Dep't, 287 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1979)
(no time limit stated).
For two articles critical of termination of parental rights, see Note, Mothers Behind Bars: A
Look at the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Women, 4 ENG. J. ON PRIsON L. 141 (1977); Note,
On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie that Binds, 87 YALE L.J. 1408 (1978).
193. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(F)(4) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(4) (Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT.ch. 40, § 1501(I)(D)(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 316-5-4.1 (Burns Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(5) (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1601(A)(I) (West Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.106(5) (1986); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 384-b(8)(b) (McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(5) (West
Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(I)(B)(i) (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a48(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48-415(5)(a) (West Supp. 1985); WYO.STAT. § 142-309(a)(iv) (Supp. 1985).
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or immoral activities, such as adultery, as possible grounds for termination of parental rights. 9"
Even general "unfitness""' appears as a ground in some statutes.
This term would probably be subject, however, to attack as it appears
to be unconstitutionally vague. 96 Therefore, many statutes contain a
list of specific items, such as mental incapacity, which are merely indicative of unfitness.' 9 7 At least twenty-seven states specify mental illness
as a ground for termination of parental rights.' 9" Most states limit termination orders solely on the basis of general grounds such as parental
unfitness by requiring a finding that the termination be in the best in99
terest of the child.'

194. See. e.g.. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(A) (Supp. 1985); CAL. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(2)(b) (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §
1501(l)(D)(i), () (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (depravity; open and notorious adultery or fornication); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221(b)(4) (West Supp. 1986).
195. See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(5) (1975) (amended 1980). The amended
version of § 1103(5) cures any void for vagueness problem by specifying that the parents "are not
able, or have failed, to plan adequately for the child's physical needs or his mental or emotional
health and development ....." Id. tit. 13, § 1103(5) (1981).
196. For a discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine, see supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
197. See. e.g.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(3) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56128(F)(1) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1986); CoLo. REV. STAT. §
19-11-105(2)(a) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(4) (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 57161(b)(l)(F) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(d) (1979); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384b(4)(c) (McKinney 1983).
198. See ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(3) (Supp. 1985); CAL. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(6)
(West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(2)(a) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
1103(4) (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-61(b)(l)(F) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(d)
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(1) (Supp. 1985); Ky REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(3)(a)
(Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1601(F)(2) (West 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15103(3)(d)(i) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(2)(a) (1985); NEa. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §
128.106(l) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(IV) (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-19 (West
1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(7)
(1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(2)(a) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(1) (Supp. 1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(l)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(3)(a)
(West Supp. 1985).
199. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.82 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(b) (West Supp.
1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-111(1.1), 19-11-105(3) (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-43(d)(4)-(5), 45-61a (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1108(a) (1981); D.C.
CODE ANN. 16-2353(a) (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-63 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(e)
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4
(Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.4(4) (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
199.603(l) (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1601(E)(4) (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2) (Vernon Supp.
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607(3) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105 (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-C:l (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614(l) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. SoC. SERV.
LAW § 384-b(I)(b) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN..§
(Page
Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(3) (West Supp.
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Other grounds for termination are deprivation or neglect, which
are sometimes stated generally 20 0 or are sometimes described more specifically in terms of physical, emotional, or moral harm to the child.20 1
These grounds resemble those for care and protection proceedings in
which the juvenile court initially takes jurisdiction over the child. 2
Under the termination statutes, however, there is usually a criterion
03
that the risk of injury to the child is likely to continue.

1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2511 (b) (Purdon Supp. 1986) ("needs and welfare of the child");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1570 (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("welfare of the child"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-8-36 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d) (Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
15.02(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(I)(a) (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33, § 657(3) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(A) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
48.426(2) (West Supp. 1985). See also In re Larson, 312 Minn. 210, 251 N.W.2d 325 (1977).
200. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(2) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(I)(D)(d) (Smith-Hurd 1986); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(e) (Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(I)(b) (1974); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.415(2)(a) (West 1985).
201. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(B) (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(H)
(Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(3) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a(a)(3),
(4) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(5)(a)(1) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 162353(b)(2) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(27) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1151(a)(2) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(b) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(4) (Supp.
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(3)(c) (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:1600(7)(b) (West 1983); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221(b)(2) (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.447(2)(2)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(3) (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-292(3) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.014(2) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170C:5(I) (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614 (McKinney 1983) (defines permanently neglected
child); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b(7)(a), (c) (McKinney 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(3)
(1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 2511 (a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d) (Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
15.02(1)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 656(a) (1981); W. VA. CODE § 49-65(b)(5) (Supp. 1985); Wvo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (Supp. 1985).
202. For a fuller discussion of this initial intervention procedure, see FAMILY LAW, supra
note 10, ch. (chapter on child abuse and neglect).
203. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(3)
(Supp. 1985); CAL. CiV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11105(l)(b)(III) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(5)(a)(2) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1151(a)(2) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(l)(D)(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-6-5-4(2) (Burns Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(a) (1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.603(l)(b) (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1601(B)(2) (West 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(l)(c)(ii)
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.107(3) (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(lll) (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614(l)(d) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(3) (Supp. 1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(I)(b) (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(4) (Page Supp. 1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(3) (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(2) (1985);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2511(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(c) (Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-36 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d)(I)(B)
(Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B)(2) (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.180(5)
(West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(a)(6) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(2)(c)
(West Supp. 1985).
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A closely associated ground is child abuse,20° which is sometimes
stated generally,20 5 although phrases such as "inflicting physical or
mental injuries on the child," 2 0° "cruelty or violence," ' 7 "placing the
child in life-endangering situations,"20 or "unexplained serious injury "209 are often used. In addition, at least fourteen states and the
District of Columbia specify sexual abuse as a ground for terminating
parental rights. 10
Interestingly, most of the major changes in termination statutes
show a trend toward guaranteeing parents that they will receive more
specific notice.2 1 This has been achieved both by including lists of
grounds such as mental incapacity, instead of broad standards such as

204. See. e.g.. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §
1501(I)(D)(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(4)(e) (McKinney 1983).
205. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(b) (Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
251 I(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6(l) (1985).
206. See AI.ASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(F) (Supp. 1985); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8531(1) (Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(23) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West
Supp. 1986): GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-51(a)(2) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-13(b)(I) (Burns
Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(3)(a) (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(2)
(1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1600(l) (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221(b)(4)
(West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-102(3)(a) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.106(2) (1986); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §
384-b(8)(a) (McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(5) (West Supp. 1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(l) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d)(I)(A) (Supp.
1985): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(2) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B)(I) (Supp. 1985);
W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(b)(5) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STATS ANN. § 48.415(5) (West Supp. 1985);
Wvo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
207. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 16-2002(e)
(1979); KAN STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(2) (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1601(A)(2)
(West 1983); NEv. REV. STAT. § 128.106(2) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-19 (West 1976); OR.
REV. STAT. § 419.523(2)(b) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(2) (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-102(10)(B) (Supp. 1985).
208. See COL. REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(2) (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(2)(c)
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.014(5) (1986); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(8)(a) (McKinney
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(19) (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(6) (1985);
VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B)(I) (Supp. 1985).
209. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(3)(b) (West 1985).
210. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(D) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1I105(2)(b) (1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(23) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West
Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(3)(a) (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(2)
(Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1600(I) (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.447(2)(2)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(3)(b) (1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 128.106(2) (1986); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(8)(b) (McKinney 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419.523(2)(b) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(b) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-228(A)(4) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 48.415(2m) (West Supp. 1985).
211. For a discussion of the procedural due process void for vagueness problem, see supra
notes 156-85 and accompanying text. The constitutionally objectionable aspect of a vague statute
is that it fails to provide sufficient notice to a potential offender as to what types of behavior will
result in legal sanctions. For a listing of the statutes that provide for notice and a hearing, see
infra note
221.
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unfitness, as well as by focusing on the actions of the parents after the
child has been taken under the jurisdiction of the court in a care and
protection proceeding. Consequently, failure to communicate with the
child placed in temporary foster care212 or to make progress toward
rehabilitation 213 are now common prerequisites for termination of parental rights. Similarly, statutes may require that parents formulate a
plan for rehabilitating themselves," 4 and some even mandate that social services be given to parents in an effort to rehabilitate them before
resorting to termination. 1 5 In one case, the mother alleged failure to
provide services as a defense, but the court rejected this defense, holding that it was the mother "who had to mend her ways, and she knew
it" 21 6 and that she "never at any time requested aid or assistance from
the Division of Family Services .
"217 Another similar trend is toward establishing time limits for either returning the child to the thenrehabilitated parents or else freeing the child for adoption or a permanent foster care home by terminating parental rights. 18 This procedure

212. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(1) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(7)
(West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(l)(D)(n) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 1983).
213. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(F) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11105(I)(b)(1) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).

214.

See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(I)(D)(m) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); N.Y. Soc.

SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(e),(f) (McKinney 1983).
215. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-105(2)(i) (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(7)
(Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1601(F)(4) (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.221(b)(5) (West Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1985); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 211.447(3)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(i)(c)(i)
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(6) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.107(I) (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(il) (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614(c) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(3) (Supp. 1985);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1130(A)(3) (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(2)(e) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
251 I(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b) (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-8-35.2 (1984); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B)(2)(c) (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
13.34.180(4) (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(b)(3) (Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-

309(a)(iii) (Supp. 1985).
216. State ex rel. T.G. v. H.G., 532 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1975).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Section 232(a)(2) provides:
[A person] [w]ho has been neglected or cruelly treated by either or both parents [is entitled to be declared free from the parent's custody and control], if the child has been a
dependent child of the juvenile court under any subdivision of Section 300 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code and the parent or parents have been deprived of the child's custody
for one year prior to the filing of a petition pursuant to this section. Physical custody by the
parent or parents for insubstantial periods of time shall not serve to interrupt the one year
period.
Id. (emphasis added). See also id. § 232(a)(7) (provides for termination when the child has been
in custody of an agency for a one-year period and the parent continues to be unfit with no prospect
for rehabilitation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(5)(a) (1981) (provides for termination when
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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may be unconstitutional, however, as evidenced by a holding of a Maryland appellate court that struck down a statutory presumption that it
was in the best interests of a child to grant an involuntary termination
when the child had been in continuous foster care for two years or
longer. 1
child has spent one year in custody of an agency and there is little likelihood that conditions
leading to placement will be remedied); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501(t)(D)(m),(n)_ (SmithHurd Supp. 1986) (provides for termination when child has spent one year in placement and
parent has made no reasonable effort, reasonable rehabilitative progress, or maintained reasonable
contact with child or formulated a plan to achieve return of the child); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-54 (Burns Supp. 1985) (termination following six months in placement and judicial finding that
parent failed to improve with little likelihood of improvement in the future); IOWA CODE ANN. §
232.116(4)-(6) (West 1985) (may terminate if placement has lasted one year and there is clear
and convincing evidence that child will be harmed if returned home, or placement has lasted six
months to one year and evidence that child will be harmed plus lack of contact with the child
when there was an opportunity to have contact; however, statute contains specific exceptions giving the court discretion not to terminate, e.g., if a relative has custody or if child is over ten years
old and objects to termination); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1601(D) (West 1983) (provides for
termination if child has spent one year in the custody of an agency and little likelihood that
conditions leading to placement will be remedied); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(B)(2)
(Supp. 1985) (provides for termination when child is in custody of agency and court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent is either unwilling or unable to protect child from jeopardy, that there is little likelihood that the situation will be changed, and that termination is in the
best interest of the child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(18) (West 1982) (no specific time requirement but termination of parental rights allowed when parents fail to be rehabilitated after
services have been provided); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(c) (Supp. 1985) (termination after one year if no contact with child and no plan for resuming parental duties); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.447(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (provides for termination if the child is out of parental custody
for six months or under judicial jurisdiction for one year and parents have failed to be rehabilitated despite reasonable efforts made by state to aid parents to correct deficiencies listed in original petition); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2511 (a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (termination after six
months and no plan to regain custody of the child resulting in judicial finding that parents are not
likely to improve and termination is in best interests of the child); R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-7-7(c)
(Supp. 1985) (termination after at least six months and finding of no possibility of resuming
parental duties); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (termination after six
months plus parental failure to be rehabilitated); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d)(1) (Supp.
1985) (termination after one year plus parental failure to be rehabilitated and need to place child
in permanent home); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(C) (Supp. 1985) (termination after one year and no
reasonable rehabilitative progress); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(2) (West Supp. 1985) (termination
if child not in parents' custody plus cumulative period of one year and substantial neglect or
willful refusal to be rehabilitated, or cumulative period of two years plus inability to be
rehabilitated).
219. See Washington County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077
(1983). The price of not having a time limit in the statute, however, may be an interminable child
neglect/custody case. For instance, the following is a description of one particular child's
circumstances:
There is no requirement in Kansas law that proceedings to terminate parental rights
be commenced within a specified time after removal of a child from his or her parents.
Although Susie either should not have been removed initially or should have been returned
promptly after the problem of sexual abuse was adequately controlled, once she had been
out of the home for a substantial length of time return became less feasible. A decision
either to sever parental rights to free her for adoption or to return her home needed to be
made.
However, no court
Published
by eCommons,
1985action was taken to ensure a permanent placement until a peti-
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Statutes may be silent as to what procedures are to be accorded
parents and children in a termination of parental rights hearing.2 20 At
least thirty-four states, however, do provide for notice and a hearing.2
More than the majority of states statutorily also provide counsel for the
parents,22 2 and this seems to be the trend. In addition, a few states
provide counsel for the child 22 and still others provide for the appoint-

tion to terminate parental rights was filed almost two years after Susie's removal from
home. The petition was not heard until eight months after filing. In the fall of 1977, the
judge found that the parents were not unfit. Instead of returning Susie to one of her parents, however, the judge ordered continued placement in foster care. In the fall of 1979,
more than two years after the decision in the first severance action, a second petition for
severance was filed by the state. By the time it was heard the next spring, Susie had been
in foster care for five years. A statutory requirement that a petition to terminate parental
rights be filed within a specified lime after placement in foster care would have hastened
permanent placement for Susie. To properly protect parental rights, as well as the best
interests of children, such a statute must be part of a scheme which also prevents undue
intervention in family life and unnecessary removal of children from their homes ....
Reynolds & Lacoursiere, Interminable Child Neglect/Custody Cases: Are There Better Alternatives? 21 J. FAM. L. 239, 254-55 (1982-83) (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g.. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(H)(5) (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-71580 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
221. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.030(b) (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-535(A) (Supp.
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1107(a) (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2357(b) (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(6)(a) (West Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-61(b)(3) (Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-2007 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-3(8) (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600A.6 (West 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1602(B) (West Supp. 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.231(3) (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.453 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-607(1) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-291 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.060
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:7 (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 616 (McKinney 1983);
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(l)(e) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.27(a) (Supp.
1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-45 (Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(B) (Page
Supp. 1985). OR. REV. STAT. § 419.525(l) (Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2513(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-13
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-127 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(2) (Supp. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 647(b) (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-263(A) (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
13.34.070(l) (Supp. 1986); W.VA. CODE § 49-6-1(b) (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.42(2)(a)
(West Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-313 (Supp. 1985).
222. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(d) (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (Supp.
1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-3(7) (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.113(1) (West
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 199.603(8) (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1602(c)
(West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 533-A(3)(A) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.462(l) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607(2) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
128.100(2) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:10 (1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384b(l)(e) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2720-49(c) (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(A) (Page Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
419.563(l) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.2 (1984); VA. CODE § 16.1-266(c)
(Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.090 (West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(a)
(Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.42(4)(c) (West Supp. 1985); Wvo. STAT. § 14-2-318(a)
(Supp. 1985).
223. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.050(b) (1984); CAL. CIV. CODE § 237.5(b) (West 1982);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-11-103(3), 19-1-106(e) (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1743a(a) (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-30(b) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-2(a)
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ment of a guardian ad litem. 22 '
Although the United States Supreme Court requires clear and
convincing evidence of the grounds for termination, 225 four state statutes still provide preponderance of the evidence as the required burden.2 26 On the other hand, twenty-three state statutes mandate the
clear and convincing standard of proof 2 7 and one even requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 2 8 An order terminating parental rights has
the effect of "completely and permanently terminat[ing] all rights and
obligations ' 229 although sometimes the order may be limited to only

1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.113(2) (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1602(c)
1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.462(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100(1) (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-49(c) (Supp.
OR. REV. STAT. § 419.563(I) (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.2 (1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 653 (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1266(B) (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.090 (West Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §
49-6-2(a) (Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-318(a) (Supp. 1985).
224. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.50(a) (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-535(D) (West
Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a(a) (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 57162 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-2007 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(9) (Baldwin 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(4)(a) (West 1982); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-107 (Supp. 1985);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.462(I) (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607(3) (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-292(6) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100(1) (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
170-C:8 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-48 (1974);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281 (Page Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149 (1984); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 653 (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-266 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
13.34.100 (Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-312 (Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the function of
guardians ad litem, see Deardurff, Representing the Interests of the Abused and Neglected Child:
The Guardian Ad Litem and Access to Confidential Information, II U. DAYTON L. REV. 649
(1986).
225. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) ("clear and convincing evidence" is
minimum standard of proof that is constitutionally permissible at a termination of parental rights
hearing).
226. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-111(1.1) (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-13(a)
(Burns Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.603(1) (Baldwin 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
128.090(3) (1986).
227. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-537(B)
(West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43(a) (West Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-2359(") (1981); IDAHO CODE 16-2009 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9(2)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(a)
(Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1603(A) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
4055(I)(B)(2) (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.241(1) (West 1982); MIss. CODE ANN. 9315-109 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:10 (1978); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
384b(3)(g) (McKinney 1983) ("clear and convincing proof"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e)
(1981); ND. CENT. CODE § 27.20.44(2) (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2151.35 (Page Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22(5) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d) (Supp.
1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B) (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.190(I)(a) (West
Supp. 1986) ("clear, cogent, and convincing"); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(c) (Supp. 1985); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-2-309(a) (Supp. 1985).
228. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1603(A) (West 1983).
229.
See, e.g., N.C. 1985
GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1981).
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one parent.2 3 0 Finally, the statute may specify that the order is
appealable. 31
VI.

STATUTORY DEFENSES: FAILURE TO PROVIDE REHABILITATIVE
SERVICES

Aside from failure to prove the statutory grounds and violation of
constitutionally required procedures, a recurring statutory or common
law defense to an action for termination of parental rights is failure by
the social service agency to provide services that will help to reunite the
family. Given the high regard that protection of the natural family unit
holds in the public policies of most states, many states require that
rehabilitative services be tried and failed as a precondition to filing a
successful petition for termination of parental rights.
There are several variations of this requirement. In Alaska, a social service agency must offer to provide all reasonable services necessary to protect the child in the home before it may file for termination
of parental rights.2" 2 The juvenile court subsequently reviews the adequacy of the services that were provided. 33 Similarly, Rhode Island
specifies that the parent against whom the termination of parental
rights action is filed, must have failed to provide proper care despite
reasonable efforts by the agency to rehabilitate the family. 34 Minnesota has a slightly less stringent requirement, merely directing the
court to consider the adequacy and propriety of the services provided. 3 5 On the other hand, Maine has a slightly more stringent requirement. 36 The social service agency must not only arrange rehabili-

230. See, e.g.. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-538(C)
(1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 238 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-108(l) (Supp. 1985).
231. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(i) (1984); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-236 (West Supp.
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-135 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 238 (West 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-11-109 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68k (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1109 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2362(b) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-64 (1985);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-63 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-2014 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-717 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.14 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1591
(Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.617 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1604
(West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.477(5) (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-612
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.120 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:15 (1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-289.34 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56(1) (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1130(C) (West 1985): OR. REV. STAT. § 419.561 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-58.1
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-51 (1977); VA.
CODE § 16.1-296 (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(e) (Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
48.43(6) (West Supp. 1985).
232. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.030(d) (1984).
233. See id. § 47.10.083.
234. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(3) (Supp. 1985).
235. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(7)(5) (West 1982).
236. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (Supp. 1985).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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tative services for the parents, but it must also notify the parents in
writing of the child's address when the child is removed from the home
and facilitate visitation between the natural parents and the child.23 7
Periodic detailed discussion of the reasons for the child's removal, of
what specific improvements must be made before the child will be returned, and of what services are available must also be provided. 23 Oregon also requires social service agencies to make reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the family. 39 Nevertheless, in one
case, the court did not require the agency to fulfill this statutory duty
prior to ordering termination of parental rights because if found that
the father's lack of mental capacity made the situation hopeless. 24 0 This
case appears to create an exception to the requirement of providing
rehabilitative services for instances where such efforts would be futile
and would unnecessarily delay improving the child's situation.
The requirement of providing rehabilitative services, except when
there is little hope of improvement, seems to be the trend. This can be
illustrated by the fact that at least one state, New Hampshire, has
241
adopted this duty by case law when it was not required by statute.
There were, however, welfare regulations requiring rehabilitative services upon which the court partially relied in reaching its holding.242
The social worker had met with the father on one previous occasion,
but had not consulted with the prior social worker. Therefore, the social worker never realized that health problems were the source of the
father's deficiencies.2 43 It is significant that the court placed the burden
of proof on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
agency had complied with its own regulations requiring that "every ef244
fort" be made to rehabilitate the family.
Instead of merely mandating that rehabilitative services be provided, at least seven states require that the social service agency sub-

237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(2)(e) (1985).
240. See In re McDaniel, 46 Or. App. 65, 610 P.2d 321 (1980). One commentator strongly
disagrees:
Furthermore, studies have shown that of the mentally retarded parents who do provide
proper care for their children, many have had the benefit of homemaker or social work
services. This indicates that mentally retarded persons are capable of benefiting from rehabilitative programs, refuting the notion that support services would not be effective.
Note, The Constitutionality of New York's Parental Termination Statute As Applied to the
Mentally Retarded Parent: Equal Protection and Due Process Objections, 46 ALB. L. REV. 271,
287 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
241. See State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
242. Id. at 718-19, 393 A.2d at 1390-91.
243. Id. at 718, 393 A.2d at 1390.
244.
Id. at 720, 3931985
A.2d at 1391.
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mit, usually to a court, a written plan for accomplishing this goal.2 45
For example, in Virginia, 48 when a child has been removed from the
home of his natural parents, a foster care plan must be filed with the
court within sixty days of the disposition.247 Included in the plan must
be a description of the services that will be provided, the visitation that
will be allowed, the reason for the type of placement given the child,
and what the parents must do in order to obtain the return of their
child.I 4 81nstead of a "plan," two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia
and the State of Washington, require the submission of a "social
study. '2 49 Aside from the nomenclature, however, the requirements are
the same as those required by the Virginia plan just described except
that the agency must also encourage maximum contact between the
child and natural parents and it must investigate and minimize any
possible harmful effects the removal of the child from the natural parents might have on the child. 2 5°Another variation of this same theme is
Florida's requirement of a "performance agreement. 2 51 What is unusual about the Florida "performance agreement" is that if any of the
numerous detailed provisions are violated by the social service agency,
the court may find the agency in contempt, may order the agency to
file a plan for how it will comply with the performance agreement, or
may even require the agency to show cause why the child should not be
reunited immediately with the natural parents.2 52 A case interpreting a
New York statute provides an illustration of what might happen when
an agency frustrates a court's expectation that the agency will provide
53
254 required
and
a plan.make
In In"diligent
re Suzanne,
York statute
255
that act
the onagency
efforts"a New
to rehabilitate
the family.

245. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2319 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168(4) (West Supp.
1986); IowA CODE ANN. § 232.102(5) (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (Supp.
1986); N.Y. Soc SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(f) (McKinney 1983) (requirement of plan read into
requirement of "diligent efforts" in In re Suzanne, 102 Misc. 2d 215, 423 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Fam.
Ct. 1979)); VA. CODE § 16.1-281 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.120 (West Supp.
1986).
246. See VA. CODE § 16.1-281(B) (Supp. 1985) (specific time for when the agency plans to
return child must be stated and if agency decides that it is not possible to return child, reasons
must be given for discontinuing as well as for type of permanent placement the agency proposes).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2319 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.120 (West
Supp. 1986).

250. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2319(c)(2) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.120(2)
(West Supp. 1986).
251. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168(3)(a) (West Supp. 1986).
252. Id. § 409.168(3)(g)(2).
253. 102 Misc. 2d 215, 423 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
254. NEW YORK SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(f) (McKinney 1983).
255. Suzanne, 102 Misc. 2d at 218, 423 N.Y.S.2d
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/4
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The agency, according to the court, failed to investigate and formulate
plans for services. 56 Giving "short shrift" to the agency's excuse that
such plans and services would be difficult to provide, the court denied
the petition to terminate the parent's rights, reasoning that the agency
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that it had met its statutory duty.2 5 It may be that this case is a better illustration of judicial
abhorrence toward removing children from natural parents when the8
25
primary deficiency is poverty than it is of the requirement of a plan.
In any event, it seems safe to conclude that many states place the burden, either preponderance of the evidence,2 59 clear and convincing evidence,26 0 or beyond a reasonable doubt26 1 , on the agency to demonstrate that it has reasonably attempted to rehabilitate and reunite the
family. Thus, alleging failure to fulfill this duty to provide rehabilitative services may provide a viable defense against involuntary termination of parental rights.

256. Id. at 220-22, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99.
257. Id. at 222, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
258. Another example of such abhorrence is In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1980). In
this case, a thirteen-year-old boy was living in one dirty room where he had to sleep on the floor.
The apartment had no bathing facilities nor a refrigerator, but a neighbor's refrigerator was used
and the boy bathed at his sister's. The mother provided meals and supervision and used a laundromat. The court ruled that serious harm was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
1039. See also Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Resources, 220 Va. 921, 265 S.E.2d 692
(1980).
259. See. e.g., Suzanne, 102 Misc. 2d 215, 423 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Fain. Ct. 1979). Recall that
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), has constitutionally mandated a clear and convincing
evidence standard by declaring unconstitutional the mere preponderance of the evidence standard
in the New York termination of parental rights statute. Thus, it is now clear that a state must
prove its allegations against a parent by at least clear and convincing evidence. Query whether
this means that an agency must prove that it made "diligent efforts" by clear and convincing
evidence.
260. See, e.g., Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1980).
261. See. e.g., Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
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